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CHAPTER 1 “PUBLIC FIRE SERVICE – THOUGHTS ON UTILITY, ECONOMIC 
WELFARE, AND EQUITY” 
1.1 Introduction 
This research is concerned with various welfare economic aspects of public service alloca-
tion, particularly with regard to public fire service. Although subject to substantial debate in the 
1970s and 80s, this topic has not received much attention over the last two decades. However, not 
only has current research on fire risk determinants brought new insights with regard to socio-eco-
nomic, housing, and spatial factors, but it is also worth revisiting the difficult question of “fair” 
distribution of public service in times of severe public budget constraints. 
Section 1.2 develops a theoretical model to describe utility gained by individuals as a result 
of public fire service, expressed in terms of service quality. Using von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility functions, I account for various fire risk groups, depending on socio-economic, housing, 
and spatial factors. In a second step, I build on existing literature to describe the functional diffi-
culties accompanying the technology and cost structure of public fire service. Thereafter, I employ 
comparative statics to analyze the effect of a change in public budget on service quality, and thus, 
utility of various fire risk groups. 
Section 1.3 links quality of fire service to two extreme theoretical social welfare frame-
works – Utilitarianism and Rawlsianism. Based on that, I then review several aspects of equity and 
assess their applicability with regard to public fire service. Section 1.4 can be described as a case 
study, where I test various equity concepts empirically using Detroit incident micro data from 
2012. I employ a GIS equity mapping strategy to analyze a change in Detroit’s fire service budget, 
effective in the middle of 2012, with respect to its impact on intra-city service allocation and two 
dimensions of equity. 
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1.2 Utility and fire risk – a model 
Based on previous literature, the following section develops a theoretical model to analyze 
various aspects of individual utility gained through the provision of fire service. First, I account 
for non-constant fire risk across different groups of individuals based on socio-economic, housing, 
and spatial factors, and describe how the quality of fire service can affect utility gained by these 
risk groups. Second, I discuss various issues regarding the output and cost structures of fire service, 
which will also include the comparison of standard production functions and scale economies. 
Thereafter, I carry out a constrained utility maximization to derive the effect of a change in budget 
on quality of fire service, and hence on individual utility.  
1.2.1 Utility and quality of fire service 
Duncombe (1991) drew on an expenditure model to describe individual local public service 
demand. Based on the work of Bowen (1943), he presented the preference structure of a median 
voter who gains utility from housing and other private goods. Following his line of reasoning, we 
can interpret equation (1) below as individual utility gained both through the consumption of pub-
lic fire service (F), as well as all other public services (Z), including police protection, public ed-
ucation, refuse collection, and other non-specified locally financed public services. I will assume 
that the corresponding input factors are demanded and paid for by a public entity in order to pro-
vide fundamental services to individuals. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, (Z) is de-
fined as a numéraire with a price of 𝑝𝑍 = 1. It is then convenient to divide public services into 
those affecting the value of a house (H), and others, not affecting the value of a house (B). Under 
the assumption that fire service (F) only affects the value of a house, we can describe utility gained 
through the value of a house as a function of fire service, 𝐻 = ℎ(𝐹). It is frankly acknowledged 
that the duties of the fire department embrace a myriad of tasks other than dealing with building 
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fires. However, this simplification allows me to investigate the link between quality of fire service 
and individual utility more closely throughout this study. Public services not affecting the value of 
a house (B), on the other hand, can be represented as a function of (Z), so that 𝐵 = 𝑣(𝑍). 
𝑈 = 𝑢(ℎ(𝐹), 𝑣(𝑍)) (1) 
Let us further suppose that fire service can be provided at different levels of quality which 
depend on a number of parameters. Ahlbrandt (1973) recognized four different groups of param-
eters – fire prevention, fire suppression, first aid, and training. Flynn (2009) described eight pa-
rameters in greater detail. The first one is known as fire rate, and is defined as the number of 
reported fires per 1,000 population, or the number of reported fires per 1,000 buildings (by occu-
pancy). This variable can be used to measure fire prevention efforts by the fire department and 
other institutions. The second parameter is called fire response and control times. While there 
exists an extensive body of literature dealing with various issues of this indicator, it is widely used 
to describe the performance of fire service, due to its level of availability and simple calculation. 
Fire response time can be divided into turnout time and travel time. According to the National Fire 
Protection Agency (NFPA), turnout time is defined as: “The time interval that begins when the 
emergency response facilities’ (ERFs) and emergency response units’ (ERUs) notification process 
begins by either an audible alarm or visual annunciation, or both, and ends at the beginning point 
of travel time” (NFPA, 2010, p.1710-7). Travel time measures the time until an engine company 
gets on scene. The second part of the indicator, time to control of fire, measures the period between 
arrival of the fire engine or unit, and control of the fire. Parameter three is known as fire spread, 
defined as “[…] the extent of fire spread in terms of how far the flame damage extended. This 
includes areas that are actually burned or charred, but not areas receiving only heat, smoke or water 
damage” (Flynn, 2009, p.17). The fourth quality indicator is the civilian fire death and injury rate. 
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Common definitions use the number of civilian deaths (or injuries) per 100,000 population, or the 
number of civilian deaths (injuries) per 1,000 fires. Parameter five denotes the firefighter death 
and injury rate, which can be calculated similarly to the previous variable: number of firefighter 
fatalities (injuries) per 1,000 firefighters, or number of firefighter fatalities (injuries) per 1,000 
fires. Human saves and rescues can be used as a sixth quality indicator. It captures the saves to be 
reported “[…] in terms of danger the fire posed to the person saved and the degree of assistance 
needed” (Flynn, 2009, p.22). Performance parameter number seven is known as property saves, 
which can be measured in several ways. It can either be done in total dollars saved in terms of 
structure and contents, average dollars saved per fire, or percentage of fires in which dollars saved 
was greater than “x” amount of dollars. Finally, Flynn (2009) listed training and certification as 
the eighth parameter, which measures the percentage of firefighters with completed, up-to-date 
training, or percentage of firefighters that are certified.  
Formally, we can now define public fire service as a function of quality: 
𝐹 = 𝑒(𝑄𝐹). (2) 
Based on these definitions, it is also possible to develop a loss function (L) which indicates the 
effect of a fire on individual utility, where (L) is expressed in terms of quality of fire service (𝑄𝐹). 
This can be most conveniently represented in terms of fire response time (t), the time it takes the 
fire service to get on scene, since “time is of the essence if losses are to be limited” (Rider, 1979, 
p.249). Barr and Caputo (2003) also stressed the importance of this statement, as, due to the expo-
nential growth structure of a typical fire, response time is critical to minimize losses. Formally, 
this substitution can be written as follows: 
𝐿 = 𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹)). (3) 
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Rider (1976) offered a definition for average response time which has proven to be a good predic-
tor while being used at the New York City Fire Department. According to his theory, response 
time (t) depends on the size of the area (A), the number of companies allocated to this area (n), as 
well as the average number of companies busy in the area (b), and travel coefficients (c), (𝛼), 
determined by street configuration, company location, and other factors. Equation (4) formally 
describes Rider’s approach: 
𝑡 = 𝑐 [
𝐴
𝑛 − 𝑏
]
𝛼
. (4) 
Let us now consider fire service in an expected utility framework. To accomplish this, I 
employ a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function of the following general form:  
𝐸𝑈 = ∑𝜋𝑗𝑢(𝑎𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
, (5) 
where 𝜋𝑗 is the probability of outcome 𝑎𝑗 (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). By employing 
this function in our framework, expected utility gained by consumers now depends on the proba-
bility that fire service is actually needed, or, in other words, how likely it is for a fire to occur. 
Therefore, we can add 𝜋𝑓 = [0,1], which signifies the probability of the occurrence of such event, 
and (1 − 𝜋𝑓), which is the complementary event. As a result, our utility function takes the follow-
ing expected form: 
𝐸𝑈𝐹 = 𝜋𝑓𝑢(𝑎𝐿) + (1 − 𝜋𝑓)𝑢(𝑎), (6) 
where 𝐿 ∈ [0,1] indicates the severity of the loss in case of the event of a fire. By substituting 
equations (1) and (3) into equation (6), we arrive at the following: 
𝐸𝑈𝐹(𝜋𝑓 , 𝑄𝐹 , 𝐻, 𝑍) = 𝜋
𝑓𝑢[𝐻𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + (1 − 𝜋
𝑓)𝑢(𝐻) + 𝑣(𝑍), (7) 
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where 𝑒(𝑡) can be regarded as a function determining the fraction of housing value left if it takes 
fire service 𝑡 minutes to get on scene, where 𝑒(0) = 1, 𝑒′(𝑡) is a decreasing function of 𝑡, 𝑒(𝑡) is 
a concave function of 𝑡, and 𝑒(𝑡) = 0 for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇 for some value of 𝑇. 
Furthermore, we can account for a variety of different “fire-risk groups”. This is based on 
the observation that fires are not distributed uniformly across any given urban space. In their work 
on optimal fire station distribution, Corman et al. (1976) have already emphasized that fire risk 
varies greatly across different regions of a city. Other researchers found that the occurrence of fires 
may depend on socio-economic, housing, and other spatial factors. Accordingly, many studies 
pointed out strong evidence for a positive relationship between poverty and fire risk (see, e.g., 
Gunther (1981), Fahy and Norton (1989), Chhetri et al. (2010)). Others noted that housing age, the 
level of vacancy, and the rate of abandoned structures in a particular area may be positively corre-
lated to fire risk (see, e.g., Accordino (2000), Shai (2006)). Finally, some literature discussed spa-
tial spillover effects, where the case seems to be that the closer in proximity a lower fire risk area 
(area A) is to an area experiencing a relatively higher fire risk (area B), there may also be an 
increase in the fire risk in area A (see, e.g., Corcoran et al. (2007), (2013)). Based on this evidence, 
it seems necessary to account for these various aspects of fire risk in our theoretical model. We 
can therefore account for different individuals, or groups of individuals 𝑖 = {1,2, … , 𝑛} who, based 
on socio-economic factors (X), housing factors (R), and spatial factors (S), vary in the fire risk they 
face. We can define 𝜋𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖), and substitute it into equation (7), leading to an expression 
which can be interpreted as individual expected utility dependent on fire risk and quality of fire 
service: 
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𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝐹(𝜋𝑖
𝑓 , 𝑄𝐹, 𝐻𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍) = 𝜋𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖)𝑢[𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + 
 
 
(1 − 𝜋𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑆𝑖)) 𝑢(𝐻𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑍). (8) 
Let us now turn to what this result might imply for groups of individuals facing various 
risks of actually experiencing a fire. In the simplest, most extreme case, we can think of two 
groups, 𝑖 = {1,2}. Group 1 faces a relatively high risk of fire, and group 2 faces a relatively low 
risk of fire. Therefore, 𝜋1
𝑓 > 𝜋2
𝑓
, and (𝜋1
𝑓 , 𝜋2
𝑓) ∈ [0,1], where a probability of 1 indicates that fire 
service will be needed with certainty. Let us further assume that quality of fire service can be 
measured on a scale between 0 and 1, where the latter specifies the best possible service, 𝑄𝐹 ∈
[0,1].  
In the first extreme scenario (𝛼), I consider a situation where a given, non-further specified 
governmental budget is sufficient to provide fire service of excellent quality, 𝑄𝐹 = 1. We can think 
about it as Ahlbrandt’s (1973) group one quality indicators, that is perfect fire prevention. As a 
result, losses can be eliminated altogether. In other words, preventative efforts preclude fires from 
causing any damage. Furthermore, I assume that, based on their fire risk factors defined earlier, 
the group 1 individuals will need the fire department with certainty, and that group 2 will certainly 
not need it. The expected utility equations for groups 1 and 2 take on the following forms, respec-
tively: 
𝐸𝑈1
𝐹(𝜋1
𝑓 , 𝑄𝐹 , 𝐻1, 𝑍) = 𝑢[𝐻1𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + (1 − 1)𝑢(𝐻1) + 𝑣(𝑍)  
= 𝑢[𝐻1𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + 𝑣(𝑍) (9) 
= 𝑢(𝐻1𝑒(0)) + 𝑣(𝑍), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒(0) = 1  
= 𝑢(𝐻1) + 𝑣(𝑍) (10) 
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𝐸𝑈2
𝐹(𝜋2
𝑓 , 𝑄𝐹 , 𝐻2, 𝑍) = 0𝑢[𝐻2𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + (1 − 0)𝑢(𝐻2) + 𝑣(𝑍)  
= 𝑢(𝐻2) + 𝑣(𝑍). (11) 
This result suggests, regardless of the fire risk each group faces, and as long as the quality of fire 
service cannot be further improved, both of them can realize the maximum utility possible, given 
their individual endowments. Moreover, it is possible to show that the expected utility of both 
groups is the same, as long as 𝐻1 = 𝐻2, whereas both groups can still differ in fire risk based on 
𝑋1 ≠ 𝑋2, 𝑅1 ≠ 𝑅2, and 𝑆1 ≠ 𝑆2. 
⟹ 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 = 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹. (12) 
In a second scenario (𝛽), I consider another extreme situation where the governmental 
budget has significantly decreased, and, as a result, the quality of fire service is zero, 𝑄𝐹 = 0. In 
other words, one might argue that there is no fire protection at all. The probabilities of fire risk 
have not changed among the groups and are still determined by socio-economic, housing, and 
spatial factors. However, the potential loss caused through fire is now at its maximum, indicated 
by the complete destruction of the house: 
𝐸𝑈1
𝐹(𝜋𝑓
1, 𝑄𝐹 , 𝐻1, 𝑍) = 1𝑢[𝐻1𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + (1 − 1)𝑢(𝐻1) + 𝑣(𝑍)  
= 𝑢[𝐻1𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + 𝑣(𝑍) (13) 
= 𝑢(𝐻1𝑒(𝑇)) + 𝑣(𝑍), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑒(𝑇) = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢(0) = 0  
= 𝑣(𝑍) (14) 
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𝐸𝑈2
𝐹(𝜋𝑓
2, 𝑄𝐹, 𝐻2, 𝑍) = 0𝑢[𝐻2𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + (1 − 0)𝑢(𝐻2) + 𝑣(𝑍)  
= 𝑢(𝐻2) + 𝑣(𝑍) (15) 
⟹ 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 < 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹. (16) 
Now, we can see that group 1 is worse off than group 2 by 𝐻1. Both still get utility from public 
services not affecting the value of a house (𝑍), yet group 1 has to cope with the complete loss of 
𝐻1 through fire. Therefore, unlike in scenario (𝛼), it is not possible for group 1 to be equally as 
well off as group 2. 
Generalizing the two extreme cases, we can record that as long as 𝜋𝑓
1 > 𝜋𝑓
2, which is true 
by assumption, and as long as 𝐻1 ≤ 𝐻2, group 1 will always be worse off than group 2, if the 
quality of fire service is not providing maximum protection. 
1.2.2 Production and cost of fire service 
Various authors have investigated the production and cost structure of fire service in the 
past, which I would like to review at this point, and add to in some respects. Following Duncombe 
(1992), I define a standard production function for fire service with two input factors, labor (L) 
and capital (K), generating intermediate output (y): 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝐿, 𝐾), (17) 
where 𝑓 is assumed to be monotonically increasing and continuous, and a cost function  
𝐶 = 𝑐(𝑦, 𝑝𝐹), (18) 
where (𝑝𝐹) represents factor prices of labor and capital. Based on the work by Bradford et al. 
(1969), Duncombe (1992) then argued that this (first stage) output function is not capable of ac-
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counting for exogenous socio-economic factors. Only the inclusion of these factors, however, ac-
curately reflects the output of two areas, varying in the “harshness of their fire-fighting environ-
ment” (Duncombe, 1992, p. 180). Hence, in a second stage, I augment final output (F), so that it 
can be described as: 
𝑄𝐹 = 𝑔(𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑅, 𝑆), (19) 
where (X, R, S) indicate the already familiar socio-economic, housing, and spatial factors, respec-
tively, introduced earlier. In other words, this equation describes the amount of (y) needed to gen-
erate (F), adjusted for exogenous factors. By solving equation (19) for (y), and by substituting it 
into equation (18), it is then possible to expand on previous literature even further, by adding a 
quality restriction; the idea being that final output (F) is provided at quality level (𝑄𝐹), which 
implies that first stage output (y) is also adjusted for quality, which means that cost depends on the 
desired level of quality, too. The resulting expressions for output and cost appear as follows: 
𝑦(𝑄𝐹) = 𝑔
−1(𝑄𝐹, 𝑋, 𝑅, 𝑆), (20) 
𝐶(𝑄𝐹) = 𝑐[𝑔
−1(𝑄𝐹, 𝑋, 𝑅, 𝑆), 𝑝𝐹(𝑄𝐹)]. (21) 
Using nonlinear, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis, Duncombe (1992) estimated both 
a modified translog cost function (originally developed by Christensen et al. (1973)) and a labor 
share function, and found evidence that exogenous socio-economic factors are positively corre-
lated with costs in the public sector. He also found that “poor building conditions […] add signif-
icantly to the cost of providing a given level of fire service” (Duncombe, 1992, p. 184).  
The author also tested various types of production functions previously employed by other 
researchers who have also investigated issues regarding the supply and demand of public services. 
Finding a suitable functional form for public production is a trade-off between imposing re-
strictions to ensure ease of use and accurate representation of reality. Hirsch (1959), for instance, 
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used a linear production function while investigating the effect of horizontal, vertical, and circular 
integration of local government services on per capita expenditures. Southwick and Butler (1985), 
on the other hand, used a Leontief technology in order to model the production of fire protection 
in 65 major US cities. In his work on the demand for and the production of educational outputs, 
Baum (1986) used a Cobb-Douglas production technology to model the total output of educational 
services using labor and capital as inputs. By analyzing data on 197 paid municipal fire depart-
ments in the state of New York between 1984 and 1986, Duncombe (1992) empirically investi-
gated whether the use of these technologies was justified. By testing the cost function for homo-
geneity with respect to final output, the author argued that neither Cobb-Douglas nor CES produc-
tion functions fit production technology for fire service. He also found that the use of Leontief 
technology seems inappropriate when socio-economic factors are controlled for in the output func-
tion, as is the case in equation (20), since “factor substitution falls between restrictions imposed 
by Leontief and Cobb-Douglas technology” (Duncombe, 1992, p.184). 
Another stream of literature investigated scale economics in the provision of public ser-
vices, and findings were not always concordant. Early research often focused on the correlation 
between population size and public expenditure in the context of optimal city size. For municipal-
ities with a population between 10,000 and 150,000 people, for instance, Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973) looked at determinants of public expenditures in general and police protection in particular. 
By estimating a crowding parameter 𝛾 = (𝛼/(1 + 𝛿)), where 𝛼, 𝛿 denote population and tax share 
elasticity, respectively, the authors predict its value to be close to unity. In other words, no econo-
mies of scale seem to be present in the provision of public services. However, it might be possible 
that this result holds true only after a certain critical size is reached, and that scale effects can be 
found for smaller municipalities. Brueckner (1981) estimated the correlation between congestion 
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and fire protection. He found evidence for increasing returns to scale in consumption, while ex-
amining a sample of 100 communities with a size of at least 30,000 citizens. In other words, any 
level of fire protection can be provided at a lower cost in larger communities. He also found that 
fire protection increases with fire and water expenditure and decreases with hazard and population 
increase. However, his estimated congestion parameter (𝛾) predicts a one percent decrease in fire 
protection for every four percent increase in population, holding fire risk and suppression capacity 
constant. Southwick et al. (1985) used 2SLS estimation to determine supply and demand for fire 
service in large cities, while employing various loss measures as dependent variables. They found 
mixed evidence for the existence of scale economies. With respect to fire deaths, for instance, no 
significant results could be obtained. However, the number of building fires seemed to be signifi-
cantly negatively related to city size, where a one percent increase in size was estimated to lead to 
a decrease in per capita building fires of 0.5 percent, indicating a substantial scale effect.  
Finally, Duncombe and Yinger (1993) looked into returns to scale in a more differentiated, 
multidimensional way. By using the earlier introduced two stage output framework and a translog 
cost function, the authors defined returns to population scale and returns to quality scale, where 
the latter is defined as:  
𝜕(𝐶/𝐹)
𝜕𝐹
=
𝑀𝐶𝐹 − 𝐴𝐶𝐹
𝐹
, (22) 
where (F) is the second stage output, and (𝑀𝐶𝐹), (𝐴𝐶𝐹) are marginal and average cost of produc-
ing (F). Furthermore, Duncombe and colleague tested for economies of scope, defined as a situa-
tion where marginal cost of one final output decreases as the level of another goes up. Using non-
linear 2SLS regression analysis, they found evidence for constant returns to population scale, 
which implied that combining smaller fire departments would not lead to cost savings. There were, 
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however, economies of quality scale in the provision of fire protection. In combination with evi-
dent economies of scope, improving fire protection might lead to a decrease in average costs. Fi-
nally, the authors distinguished between fire prevention and fire suppression efforts. By defining 
output of fire service as the inverse of property losses, fire prevention was understood as a reduc-
tion of fires, while fire suppression was characterized by the loss per fire. Consequently, the pres-
ence of economies of scope suggested sharing of inputs of the two types of output. 
1.2.3 Budget and quality of fire service 
The goal of the following exercise is to carry out a theoretical analysis capable of describ-
ing the correlation between governmental budget and quality of public service. Numerous exam-
ples show that such theory is needed to evaluate empirical public policy decision making regarding 
the optimal supply of public service. To address the issue mathematically, I use comparative statics 
and the implicit function theorem as a tool in a constrained utility maximization framework, where 
the government, or a social planner, aims to maximize each individual’s utility through the provi-
sion of public services. Furthermore, I assume that all individuals are risk averse.  
We can start by using the expected utility function already developed earlier in this re-
search. For that matter, let us recall equation (8): 
𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝐹(𝜋𝑖
𝑓 , 𝑄𝐹, 𝐻𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍) = 𝜋𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑆𝑖)𝑢[𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + 
(1 − 𝜋𝑖
𝑓(𝑋𝑖, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑆𝑖)) 𝑢(𝐻𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑍). 
The budget constraint is determined by the government spending variable (G), and uses the cost 
function already developed earlier in equation (21) to account for the cost of fire service provided 
at quality (𝑄𝐹). Secondly, the government has to pay for all other public goods and services (Z), 
which I also have defined earlier as a numéraire. Hence, our constraint can be written as  
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𝐺 = 𝐶(𝑄𝐹) + 𝑍, (23) 
where we would like to maximize the individual expected utility: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝐹(𝜋𝑖
𝑓 , 𝑄𝐹, 𝐻𝑖, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑋𝑖, 𝑍). (24) 
The corresponding Lagrangian equation appears as follows:  
ℒ = 𝜋𝑖
𝑓𝑢[𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))] + (1 − 𝜋𝑖
𝑓)𝑢(𝐻𝑖) + 𝑣(𝑍) + 𝜆(𝐺 − 𝐶(𝑄𝐹) − 𝑍). (25) 
Taking the first order partial derivative with respect to 𝑄𝐹 , 𝑍, and the Lagrange multiplier 𝜆, we 
see: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹
= 0: 𝜋𝑖
𝑓𝐻𝑖𝑡
′(𝑄𝐹)𝑒
′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))𝑢
′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))) − 𝜆𝐶
′(𝑄𝐹) (26) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑍
= 0: 𝑣′(𝑍) − 𝜆 (27) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
= 0: 𝐺 − 𝐶(𝑄𝐹) − 𝑍. (28) 
The second order derivative takes the following special matrix form (29), (30): 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹
2
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹𝜕𝑍
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹𝜕𝜆
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍𝜕𝑄𝐹
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍2
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍𝜕𝜆
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆𝜕𝑄𝐹
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆𝜕𝑍
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (29) 
=
[
 
 
 
 𝜋𝑖
𝑓
𝐻𝑖 (𝑡
′′(𝑄𝐹)𝑒
′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))𝑢
′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))) + 𝑡
′(𝑄𝐹)
2 (𝑒′′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))𝑢
′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))) + 𝐻𝑖𝑒
′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))
2
𝑢′′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))))) − 𝜆𝐶
′′(𝑄𝐹) 0 −𝐶
′(𝑄𝐹)
0 𝑣′′(𝑍) −1
−𝐶′(𝑄𝐹) −1 0 ]
 
 
 
 
 (30) 
Employing the implicit function theorem, we know that 𝑄𝐹 , 𝑍, and 𝜆 are also functions of 𝑝𝐹 and 
𝐺. Hence, we can rewrite equations (26), (27), and (28) as follows: 
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𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹
(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝑍
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝜆
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝐺) = 
𝜋𝑖
𝑓𝐻𝑖𝑡
′(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹 , 𝐺))𝑒
′ (𝑡(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹 , 𝐺))) 𝑢
′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒 (𝑡(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹 , 𝐺)))) − 𝜆
∗(𝑝𝐹 , 𝐺)𝐶
′(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹 , 𝐺)) = 0 
(31) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑧
(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝑍
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝜆
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝐺) = 𝑣
′(𝑍∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺)) − 𝜆
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺) = 0 (32) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜆
(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝑍
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝜆
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺), 𝐺) = 𝐺 − 𝐶(𝑄𝐹
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺)) − 𝑍
∗(𝑝𝐹, 𝐺) = 0 (33) 
By taking the second order derivative with respect to 𝐺, while taking into account the implicit 
functions of 𝑄𝐹
∗ , 𝑍∗, we can obtain an expression which tells us what happens to the optimal levels 
of 𝑄𝐹
∗  and 𝑧∗ when the budget changes: 
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹
2  
𝜕𝑄𝐹
∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑍∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑄𝐹𝜕𝐺
= 0 (34) 
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍𝜕𝑄𝐹
 
𝜕𝑄𝐹
∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍2
𝜕𝑍∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝑍𝜕𝐺
= 0 (35) 
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆𝜕𝑄𝐹
 
𝜕𝑄𝐹
∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑍∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆2
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕2ℒ
𝜕𝜆𝜕𝐺
= 0 (36) 
Again, I use matrix form to simplify equations (31), (32), and (33) to arrive at: 
[
 
 
 
 𝜋𝑖
𝑓
𝐻𝑖 (𝑡
′′(𝑄𝐹)𝑒
′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))𝑢
′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))) + 𝑡
′(𝑄𝐹)
2 (𝑒′′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))𝑢
′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))) + 𝐻𝑖𝑒
′(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))
2
𝑢′′ (𝐻𝑖𝑒(𝑡(𝑄𝐹))))) − 𝜆𝐶
′′(𝑄𝐹) 0 −𝐶
′(𝑄𝐹)
0 𝑣′′(𝑍) −1
−𝐶′(𝑄𝐹) −1 0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝑄𝐹
∗
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑍∗
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐺 ]
 
 
 
 
 
= [
0
0
−1
] (37) 
Under the application of Cramer’s rule, it is now possible to swap the first column with the right 
hand side of equation (37). This is feasible since we are primarily interested in the effect on 𝑄𝐹
∗ . 
Next, we can divide everything using the bordered Hessian matrix, which, as we know, is greater 
than 0. Finally, equation (38) offers a clue to how quality of fire service changes as the budget 
changes.  
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𝜕𝑄𝐹
∗
𝜕𝐺
=
[
0 0 −𝐶′(𝑄𝐹)
0 𝑣′′(𝑍) −1
−1 −1 0
]
|𝐻|  > 0
 = (−1)
[
0 −𝐶′(𝑄𝐹)
𝑣′′(𝑍) −1
]
|𝐻|  > 0
= 
 
(−1)
[0 − [−𝐶′(𝑄𝐹)𝑣
′′(𝑍)]]
|𝐻|  > 0
 =  
−𝐶′(𝑄𝐹)𝑣
′′(𝑍)
|𝐻|  > 0
  (38) 
 
As by assumption we know that we are dealing with risk averse individuals, and find that 
𝑣′′(𝑍) < 0. Therefore, the numerator becomes positive, and so does equation (38). It follows that 
governmental spending and quality of fire service are positively correlated. More specifically, as 
the size of the budget shrinks, quality of service suffers due to increased fire response times. 
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1.3 Social welfare and equity 
1.3.1 Social welfare and fire service 
Based on previous findings, I would like to address briefly the issue of “fair” public service 
distribution, exemplified through public fire service, especially in light of the described change in 
governmental budget. Rider (1976) acknowledged the difficulty of this task by enumerating vari-
ous goal conflicts, for instance, whether the primary goal of fire service should be to minimize fire 
losses in a city, or to ensure that the risk of loss is spread evenly across a city. He also points out 
that a most equitable manner of resource allocation would imply defining a social welfare function 
first. Without question, there will be more than just one opinion on that matter. In a strictly utili-
tarian framework, for instance, one might argue that, regardless of who benefits from fire service, 
social welfare (𝑊𝑈
𝐹) is maximized as long as it is provided efficiently, for example, as long as 
output is maximized, given a certain level of inputs. As described by equation (39), total welfare 
would then be the sum of individual expected utility: 
𝑊𝑈
𝐹 = ∑𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝐹
𝑛
𝑖=1
. (39) 
Lucy (1981), who investigated aspects of equity with regard to local public planning efforts, em-
phasizes that output of fire departments is often measured in terms of potential fire losses, or po-
tential insurance claims. Therefore, it makes sense to locate fire stations close to heavily insured 
structures, such as schools, industrial plants, or department stores, as overall fire losses can poten-
tially be minimized, implying the maximization of social welfare in a utilitarian sense. The author 
then followed with “[the] proximity of fire stations to residences may be more a consequence of 
the fortuitous distribution of nonresidential structures […]” (Lucy, 1981, p.453).  
18 
 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, we can think of a social welfare function in a Rawlsian 
sense, which might be more suitable to approach the question of fair or equitable distribution of 
fire risk (Rawls, 1971). In the crudest, one-dimensional sense, social welfare can be expressed in 
terms of individual income (𝑌𝑖), so that, in a Rawlsian sense, it is determined by the poorest indi-
vidual. In the previous section, I provide evidence that fire risk in residential areas, among other 
things, is determined by socio-economic factors, one of them being income. According to earlier 
conducted research, relative fire risk is strongly correlated with the degree of poverty, and thus, 
social welfare (𝑊𝑅
𝐹) is equal to the individual facing the highest fire risk. Adapted to our frame-
work, where expected utility is gained exclusively through public services, it can be formally de-
scribed as follows: 
𝑊𝑅
𝐹 = min (𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 , 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹 , … , 𝐸𝑈𝑛
𝐹), (40) 
where 𝑊𝑅
𝐹, the overall welfare in society generated through fire service, is measured according to 
the expected utility gained by the least well-off individual. Section 2 also develops a theoretical 
model to describe who benefits from fire service, and in which way, based on quality of service. 
We have seen that high fire risk areas can possibly gain the same amount of expected utility as low 
fire risk areas, as long as the maximum quality of service is achieved. On the other hand, a situation 
of reduced quality of fire service leaves individuals living in high fire risk areas potentially worse 
off than individuals living in low fire risk areas. We have seen that the lower quality of service, 
the higher the discrepancy between the expected utility gained by groups 1 and 2, 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 and 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹, 
respectively. Therefore, it follows that in scenario (𝛽), where 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 < 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹, social welfare W𝑅𝛽
𝐹 =
 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹, whereas in scenario (𝛼), where 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 = 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹 (assuming that 𝐻1 = 𝐻2), social welfare 
W𝑅𝛼
𝐹 = 𝐸𝑈1
𝐹 = 𝐸𝑈2
𝐹. In other words, the overall social welfare in scenario (𝛼), in a Rawlsian 
sense, is greater than in scenario (𝛽): 
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𝑊𝑅𝛼
𝐹 > 𝑊𝑅𝛽
𝐹  (41) 
Scenario (𝛼) could therefore be described as a situation where individual expected utility is max-
imized, even though fire risk is not necessarily minimized. With regard to the previous analysis, it 
seems that a decrease in budget, although likely to cause an increase in response time, may not 
jeopardize an efficient outcome in a utilitarian sense, as long as output is still maximized, given 
the new diminished inputs. However, in a Rawlsian sense, the level of equity may have decreased. 
Therefore, under certain assumptions, fire service can directly affect social welfare in a Rawlsian 
framework, and, correspondingly, higher quality of fire service can lead to a more equal outcome. 
1.3.2 Equity and fire service 
Lucy (1981) also approached the issue of distributional fairness, or equity of public service 
distribution, by dividing it into five different concepts – equality, need, demand, preferences, and 
willingness to pay. He argues that although any one of these concepts can be applied separately, a 
planner should incorporate two or more, if possible, especially when deciding on marginal addition 
to, or deletion from, a certain public service. In the case of fire protection, the empirical application 
of Lucy’s logic is harder than one would expect, not only because of conflicting goals among 
dimensions, but also because of the nature of fire protection, which in some respects is quite dif-
ferent from other public services (e.g., parks, schools, or libraries). The concept of equality might 
be interpreted as a state of nature, where all individuals receive equal service. Although this is 
intuitively easy to understand, it might be difficult, or nearly impossible, to implement in practice. 
Equal service might be translated into equal fire response time, and therefore into equal distance 
from fire station to fire incident, assuming all engine companies follow the same procedures, use 
identical trucks, and face similar spatial circumstances. Clearly, this goal will remain largely un-
attainable for any planner, which is why Lucy advocated having at least certain defined threshold 
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levels. To add some more complexity, one might also distinguish equality regarding input indica-
tors, such as response time, and output indicators, such as fire loss, where equality in the former 
may not necessarily lead to equality in the latter.  
Planning according to the second concept of equity: need, by definition, already creates a 
goal conflict with the first concept. Here, a situation where someone must have something, yet 
someone else does not, leads to unequal treatment of the two. This situation was most concisely 
defined more than two thousand years ago by Aristotle. According to his view of fairness, equals 
must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally (Ostwald, 1962). In the case of 
fire protection, the implementation of this dimension seems viable, as need might be determined 
by individual fire risk, which appears to be determined by socio-economic, housing, and spatial 
factors. Planning based on need might then justify why, for instance, low income regions, or areas 
with a high poverty rate, should receive more attention by fire service than others, or why the grid 
of stations should be denser in these areas than in lower fire risk areas.  
Demand, being the third dimension, basically dictates that “active interest in a service 
should be rewarded” (Lucy, 1981, p.449). Demand can be understood in a purely microeconomic 
sense as well as a political sense. Immediately, one can see that the mere application of this concept 
can lead to a very different distribution of services compared to the previous one. Here, influence 
of interest groups may be the driving force, or, in other words, “the squeaky wheel gets the grease”. 
Moreover, it seems that, even though personal interest and taking action is honorable, this concept 
aims more at what people want, as in “a public park makes our neighborhood more beautiful”, and 
not what they actually need, in the sense of lacking essential services to protect life and property. 
The latter seems to be especially applicable for fire and police protection. 
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Preference, as the fourth concept of equity, can be understood as a more general form of 
demand, where unexpressed opinions of less publicly active individuals are also taken into account 
by the planner, as opposed to demand, which may only represent the opinion of a small, outspoken 
group. Various types of surveys may be a means to overcome the shortcomings of the demand 
concept; however, this dimension does not seem to be any more pertinent in the case of fire service 
than concept three, as most people would simply choose more protection over less, regardless of 
their individual fire risk. 
Finally, Lucy (1981) advocated willingness to pay as a dimension of equity. The idea is 
straightforward, and certainly a concept every undergraduate economics student is familiar with. 
Closely related to the concept of demand, it simply states that whoever would like to consume a 
good or service has to pay for it. Again, with regard to certain public services, this concept might 
work well if, for instance, planners are to decide whether to build a new park, where in theory, tax 
money is used to finance the park and only people who have paid their taxes are eligible to enter 
the park. Practically, this concept might be very difficult to implement, since the very definition 
of a public good or service is non-rivalry and non-excludability, leading to problems such as free-
riding, all of which have been discussed extensively in the past. With regard to fire service, the 
application of this concept seems to be especially challenging. Going back to section 1.2, we have 
seen that fire risk varies across individuals and that poverty plays a significant role. Therefore, it 
seems counterintuitive to ask for more from individuals who have less in order to meet the in-
creased need of fire protection.  
In summary, it seems that need is the most promising concept, useful both in theory and 
practice, when it comes to analyzing equity and fairness in fire service. Using GIS mapping, Talen 
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(1998) employed this concept to analyze equity empirically. Her research investigated spatial eq-
uity with respect to public parks for the city of Pueblo, California. Although not without its prob-
lems, equity mapping provides a simple alternative to a more sophisticated, quantitative spatial 
analysis, or it can at least enable the researcher to give a first assessment on the basis of which 
further inquiry regarding any public distributional subject matter can be pursued. In the final sec-
tion of this chapter, I will apply Talen’s framework to address the issue of “fair” fire service, using 
Detroit, Michigan, fire incident data. 
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1.4 Case Study – Equity of fire service in Detroit 
In Detroit, the fire department had to cope with a significant budget cut at the beginning of 
fiscal year 2013 (July 1st, 2012). As a result, the number of firefighters on duty per day decreased 
by about 30 percent and numerous fire stations had to be closed. On the one hand, the total cost of 
providing fire service could be reduced, and hence, so could overall public spending. However, it 
seems logical that benefits of fire protection, expressed as utility gained by Detroit’s citizens, 
might also have suffered. The reason is that, after the budget change, we can still assume a certain 
exogenous level of individual fire risk and spatial distribution, as developed in section 1.2, as well 
as a certain exogenous number of fire incidents. Given that, we would expect an increase in work-
load for the remaining engine companies (e.g., fires per shift), and also an overall increase in their 
travel distance, as the density of the fire station grid has decreased, which will likely lead to an 
increase in response time (Rider, 1979). The theoretical analysis of section 1.2 has shown that, as 
a result, the overall quality of fire service decreases, potentially increasing hazard to life and prop-
erty, thus causing a lower utility level for Detroit citizens. It is the goal of this exercise to find out 
whether the change in budget also had an effect on distributional equity across Detroit. 
Following Lucy (1981), in the first step, I analyze Detroit fire service with respect to equal-
ity of service. To do this, I geocode every incident of the year 2012 according to 297 Detroit census 
tracts and map them with respect to the indicator variable “distance traveled” by fire company 
between fire station and incident. The 2012 data set consists of 14,988 incidents before, and 9147 
incidents after, the closing of 13 fire stations. Map 1 shows the standard deviations of the median 
distance traveled per tract before the budget cut.  
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Map 1: Median travel distance per census tract before budget cut 2012 
 
With a value of 0.450, it comes as no surprise that the distribution is far from perfect equality (gray 
color). With an overall median distance of 0.89 miles, it appears that the closer a fire station is 
located to a tract, or is even located within a certain tract, the shorter the distance traveled by the 
fire company. Almost all of these areas show a negative deviation from the mean (green color). 
Areas located on the fringe of the city, on the other hand, are generally further away from fire 
stations, and therefore those census tracts deviate positively from the mean (orange and red color). 
This result comes as no surprise and makes sense intuitively. Map 2 displays the distribution after 
stations were closed (red stars). With a standard deviation of 0.460, the change is minimal; how-
ever, the median travel distance has increased by 16 percent to 1.03 miles. We can record that 
close proximity to open fire stations leads to a stronger negative deviation from the mean, whereas 
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close proximity to closed fire stations mostly leads to strong positive deviation. This point mani-
fests itself in the mid-western area of the city, as well as the area south and east of Hamtramck.  
Map 2: Median travel distance per census tract after budget cut 2012 
 
Even though a final judgment is not possible, it seems that, if anything, equality in terms of travel 
distance has decreased after the change in budget.  
In a second step, I analyze Detroit fire service with respect to need for service, the second 
dimension of equity proposed by Lucy (1981) and favored by Talen (1998), and link it to quality 
of fire service. The idea, how to determine need for fire service, is straightforward. I interpret need 
as individual fire risk. To approximate fire risk, I use 5-year estimates of the percentage of house-
holds living in poverty per census tract according to the 2012 American Community Survey 
(ACS). Moreover, I use the quality variable “response time”, in line with the theoretical model 
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developed earlier. Thereafter, I calculate a 4x4 matrix to determine the correlation between fire 
risk and quality. 
Figure 1: Equity and need of fire service, concept 
 
 
I divide fire risk into four poverty categories, where (1) is the lowest and (4) indicates the highest 
poverty quartile. I also divide quality into four response time categories, where (1) is the lowest 
and (4) indicates the highest response time quartile. Note that the matrix takes an inverted form, 
as quality, expressed as response time, is inversely related to the latter. In order to stay as close as 
possible to the theoretical model of section 1.2, I only look at building fires for the year 2012, 
potentially affecting housing value (H). As a result, the sample size decreases to 5914 observations 
- 3707 before, and 2207 after - the change in budget. I calculate the median response time per 
census tract, which leaves 176 observations. For the remaining census tracts, not enough building 
fires occurred in 2012 to obtain reliable results.  
Map 3 portrays the poverty distribution across Detroit. With a mean of 42 percent of all 
households living in poverty, Detroit takes on one of the highest ranks in a national comparison 
among cities, and one could argue that individual fire risk in Detroit is generally higher than in 
almost all other cities. Therefore, one could argue that the overall quality of fire service should be 
exceptionally high in order to counteract the level of overall poverty. However, if one were to 
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compare tracts within the city, poverty seems to be highest in the east, the south-west, and south 
of Highland Park, closer to the geographical center of the city.  
Map 3: Percentage of households living in poverty (ACS 5-year estimates) 
 
Based on these observations, and with respect to equity interpreted as need, one could argue that 
a fair distribution of fire service justifies a higher service quality the higher the fire risk is. In other 
words, relatively speaking, a fair distribution would justify a higher response time in areas with 
relatively lower poverty. Based on the concept described in Figure 1, that means that a combination 
of poverty quartile (1) and response time quartile (4) (scenario (14)), as well as poverty quartile 
(4) and response time quartile (1) (scenario (41)) would be considered as fair (green areas). On the 
other hand, poverty quartile (1) and response time quartile (1) (scenario (11)), as well as poverty 
quartile (4) and response time quartile (4) (scenario (44)) would be considered as unfair (red and 
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orange areas). Map 4 illustrates this type of equity map with regard to observations before the 
change in budget. In a perfectly fair distribution, we would expect exclusively green areas. How-
ever, for the 176 census tracts under investigation, no such observation can be made. Especially in 
the lower western and south-western regions, high fire risk seems to be accompanied by low ser-
vice quality. 
Map 4: Equity and need - fire risk and quality before change in budget 
 
After the cut in budget and the closing of fire stations, it appears that equity in terms of need has 
decreased, as the number of areas with both high fire risk and low quality of fire service and vice 
versa (marked in red) have increased. Map 5 shows that these tracts can be found throughout the 
city, mostly, however, in the proximity of a recently closed fire station. Nevertheless, this evalua-
tion does not hold true for the far western area of the city. The increased number of areas marked 
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(11) and (44), especially the latter, can likely be explained by the change in response time after the 
change in budget. While the poverty estimate has not changed, mean response time for building 
fires increased by nine percent, or from 4 minutes and 11 seconds, to 4 minutes and 36 seconds. 
The maximum response time per tract increased by 13 percent, from 6 minutes and 33 seconds to 
7 minutes and 13 seconds.  
Map 5: Equity and need - fire risk and quality after change in budget 
 
Concluding this case study, we can see that equity mapping is a valuable technique to vis-
ualize various dimensions of equity in an urban area. Furthermore, it seems that even though the 
equality dimension is easy to implement and easy to understand, at least for Detroit fire service, 
its informational value outside of merely theoretical considerations is limited. Although contro-
versial, the need dimension seems to be more suited for equity mapping and provides valuable 
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insight into fair distribution of public services such as fire protection. There is no doubt that the 
equity mapping approach can be refined almost indefinitely, and provides researchers and planners 
with a simple tool to approach the difficult question of equity. However, Talen was right when she 
made it clear that “the purpose of equity mapping is to stimulate further inquiry” (Talen, 1998, 
p.29). 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This research aims to add to the existing body of literature by addressing various aspects 
of individual utility, social welfare, and equity through the provision of public fire service. A mi-
croeconomic model was developed to describe expected individual utility as a result of various 
levels of service quality. A theoretical connection was established between socio-economic, hous-
ing and spatial factors, and individual fire risk. According to the model, it seems plausible that a 
change in public budget affects expected utility of individuals differently, depending on the level 
of fire risk they face. Unsurprisingly, it could be shown that quality of fire service, for instance, 
expressed in fire response time, is positively correlated with public budget. It was shown that in a 
Rawlsian framework, fire service can directly affect social welfare, and that higher service quality 
can lead to higher overall social welfare. 
In a Detroit fire service specific case study, the effect of a change in budget on the equitable 
allocation of fire service was investigated. GIS equity mapping was found to be a valuable tool for 
this job; however, more in-depth, quantitative analysis is needed to reach compelling results. It 
seems that only two proposed dimensions of equity are applicable in the case of fire service – 
equality and need. Even though the concept of equality appears to be mostly justified in a theoret-
ical context, it can be concluded that the allocation of Detroit fire service represents far from per-
fect equality, and that, if anything, the intra-city inequality has increased since the budget cut in 
2012. The concept of equity as need seems to have higher empirical relevance and was found to 
be met in some areas of Detroit, whereas, for other areas, no such conclusion could be drawn. 
Finally, there is evidence that after the new, smaller budget was implemented and numerous fire 
stations had to be closed, fewer areas achieved a fair correlation between fire risk and service 
quality than before, at least when fairness is interpreted as need for service.   
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CHAPTER 2 “FIRE RISK ACROSS DETROIT – SOCIO-ECONOMIC, HOUSING, 
AND SPATIAL FACTORS” 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between socio-economic factors such as income, race, household compo-
sition, and fire risk in an urban environment has long been of interest to researchers across disci-
plines such as urban planning, geography, engineering, and sociology. Previous literature finds 
that individuals living in poverty face a greater risk of experiencing a fire than others. Additional 
studies find mixed evidence regarding the correlation between the number of vacant structures and 
fire.  
How to tackle poverty, as well as the problem of vacant and abandoned structures, is a top 
priority on the agenda of Detroit residents and policy makers. A relatively high volume of fires, 
especially proven and suspected arson fires, contributes to the complexity of this endeavor. By 
using Detroit-specific micro data, this research examines whether socio-economic factors, various 
aspects of housing, and spatial features can explain differences in fire risk across Detroit neigh-
borhoods.  
This paper expands on existing literature by investigating not only building fires in general 
but also by distinguishing between unintentional and intentional building fires. Various fire inci-
dent maps illustrate the differences in distribution, especially between unintentional and inten-
tional fires. By using classical regression models, as well as more advanced spatial techniques, I’m 
able to account for spatial autocorrelation effects across the city. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
The relationship between various socio-economic determinants, especially low income and 
the risk of fire, has been well established over the last few decades. In this literature review, I will 
summarize briefly some of the important articles.1 Karter and Donner (1978) investigated the re-
lationship between fire rates and census characteristics of five communities in the United States. 
For Newark, New Jersey, Phoenix, Arizona, and Toledo, Ohio, their findings confirmed a strongly 
positive relationship between fire rates and poverty, measured as the percentage of persons below 
the poverty level. In Newark, the mean fire rate per 1,000 people was almost double (3.32 to 6.44) 
when comparing a low level poverty group among tracts (5 percent to 31 percent) with a high level 
poverty group (31.1 percent to 51.3 percent). In Phoenix, the mean fire rate changed from 3.07 in 
the low level poverty group (1.1 percent – 14.2 percent) to 8.31 in the high level poverty group 
(14.2 percent – 50.3 percent). Finally, in Toledo, the mean fire rate was more than twice as high 
when comparing the low poverty group (0.6 percent – 15.7 percent) with the high level poverty 
group (15.8 percent – 52 percent).  
Gunther (1981) also looked at census tract data for Toledo in conjunction with National 
Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) data to investigate the relationship between family in-
come and race on fire risk. Based on a five-group city clustering method and linear regression 
analysis, the author found a strong negative relationship between income and overall fire rates. He 
found little indication that race affects fire rates, after controlling for income. If the fire rates of 
Toledo’s low income areas, which account for almost half of the population, were reduced to the 
level encountered by middle income areas, Gunther estimated the overall number of fires would 
decrease by as much as 35 percent.  
                                                          
1 Jennings (1999, 2013) provides a comprehensive review of relevant literature. 
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Based on National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) data, Fahy and Norton (1989) expanded 
on prior work by examining 50 US cities with a population greater than 250,000 residents for the 
years 1986 and 1987. The authors analyzed the relationship between fire death rates and the per-
centage of families living below the poverty level. They found that cities with higher levels of 
poverty tended to experience higher occurrence of residential fires and were more likely to suffer 
fire deaths.  
Other authors employed multiple OLS regression analysis to explore the social and demo-
graphic correlates of fire deaths for large metropolitan areas. Using census data along with statis-
tics on fire death rates collected by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
Hannon and Shai (2003) focused on counties with a population greater than 250,000 and investi-
gated the correlation between variables such as median family income, race, age of housing stock, 
as well as vacancy rate and fire deaths. Except for vacancy rate, these variables turned out to be 
statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence interval, confirming results of previous litera-
ture. More specifically, the authors found that median family income and fire deaths were nega-
tively related, while higher age of housing stock and areas with a higher African-American popu-
lation seemed to be positively linked to fire death rates. However, by including an interaction term 
(African-American x Income), the authors found that fire death rates seemed to be highest in areas 
characterized by a high ratio of African-Americans and a low median level of income, whereas 
racial composition did not seem to be important in high income areas.  
Crawford (2005) analyzed the risk of fire for residents living below the poverty level in 
Shreveport, Louisiana. The author found that in census tracts where fire deaths were recorded 
between 1999 and 2004, on average, 50.7 percent of the households lived below the poverty thresh-
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old. Crawford stated further that in Louisiana, where about one-fourth of the population lived be-
low the poverty line, the chance of a fire-caused death was 1:40,000, whereas in New Hampshire, 
where about one-thirteenth lived below the poverty line, the ratio was 1:143,000. 
Another stream of literature embraces the effect of vacant and abandoned structures on 
building fire risk in urban surroundings. In Newark, New Jersey, Sternlieb and Burchell (1973) 
first documented this phenomenon at the beginning of the 1970s. Their findings suggested that, 
primarily, fire leads to abandonment, but also that abandonment may lead to an increase in the 
frequency of building fires. Among 1,600 of Newark’s buildings which were or became abandoned 
in 1970/71, 20 percent experienced a fire, with about 81.5 percent before the abandonment and the 
remaining fraction after it. Moreover, the analysis suggested that almost 50 percent of all aban-
doned buildings were prone to see at least two fires, and that arson was suspected in 90 percent of 
all cases.  
In 1977, Schaenman et al. used census tracts of Charlotte, North Carolina, St. Petersburg, 
Florida, San Diego, California, Seattle, Washington, and Fairfax County, Virginia, to assess the 
relationship between various socio-economic variables and fire risk. As inter-city comparisons did 
not provide meaningful results, the authors analyzed intra-city variations in fire rates. Three of 
their variables, parental presence, poverty, and the percentage of over 25-year-old individuals who 
had less than eight years of schooling, best explained variations in fire rates. Nonetheless, housing 
vacancy also turned out to be a moderately strong predictor of fire rates in some of the analyses. 
Skarbek (1989) also described abandoned buildings as potential fire hazards, particularly in regard 
to firefighters and their occupational safety.  
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Greenberg et al. (1990) investigated the “temporarily obsolete abandoned derelict sites” 
(TOADS) phenomenon and the problems that came with it. Based on interviews with urban plan-
ning and health departments of 14 of the largest cities in the US, Greenberg and his colleagues 
found that TOADS were a greater problem for cities in the northeast and the Midwest than for 
cities in the south and the west. One reason was that housing stock in the former areas was older, 
and that structural economic changes led citizens to leave their homes in order to look for employ-
ment in other regions of the country. Interviewees reported fire safety as the number one problem 
with regard to TOADS, as these buildings can catch on fire quickly due to old wiring, illegally 
dumped debris, and various other factors. Moreover, they can attract arsonists. Particularly in 
dense neighborhoods, that makes them dangerous, as they impose a risk on surrounding structures 
which might fall prey to the flames as well.  
Accordino and Johnson (2000) found that ten years later, vacant and abandoned properties 
were a problem more than ever before and ranked high on city officials’ to-do lists, as they were 
perceived as neighborhood-destabilizing and crime-fostering nuisances. The authors documented 
this in a survey of the 200 most populated cities in the US. According to their investigation, vacant 
and abandoned structures had “moderate” negative effects on fire prevention efforts.  
Shai (2006) used Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, census tract data for the years 1993 - 2001 in 
order to investigate the relationship between income, housing, and 1,563 non-fatal fire injuries. As 
already established above, it comes as no surprise that the author found a highly significant corre-
lation between low income households, defined as household with income smaller than $15,000 
in 1989, and fire injuries. She also found vacant housing to be a highly significant predictor vari-
able. As vacant structures may generally be regarded as a “contributor to decline as well as an 
indicator of it” (Shai, 2006, p.151), injuries can be caused in two different ways. Unintentional 
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injuries can be the consequence of fires ignited by people seeking shelter and warmth. Yet, it is 
also known that abandoned buildings frequently attract crime, as demonstrated by Spelman (1993). 
In that case, intentional arsonists might be responsible for an increased risk of fire injury in and 
around vacant structures.  
Summarizing the reviewed literature, we find that there is very strong evidence for a posi-
tive correlation between poverty and fire risk. For vacancy and abandonment, on the other hand, 
the link is less obvious, as there is mixed evidence regarding the level of significance.  
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2.3 Empirical Analysis 
Building on the reviewed literature, the following analysis tests whether similar results can 
be obtained for Detroit, using city-specific micro data. In a first step, I check whether there is a 
significant correlation between the risk of fire and the level of income and various other control 
variables. In a second step, I perform robustness checks in the form of kernel density analyses and 
spatial regression techniques. 
2.3.1 Estimation 
2.3.1.1 Data 
The empirical estimation is based on fire incident micro data provided by the Detroit Fire 
Department. The raw data set includes every incident from the years 2008 - 2012 and is collected 
electronically as a combination of Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data and NFIRS data. Records 
of the time period from December 11th, 2012 to December 16th, 2012 are not provided in the data 
set due to systemic malfunction. All incidents in the data set are consistently marked “priority 1”, 
and handled by the fire department. No exclusive emergency medical services (EMS) records are 
included. For this particular study, I focus on incidents indicated as “building fires”, code “111”, 
which leaves 26,488 observations over the five-year period. About 78 percent of all building fires 
are recorded as “1 or 2 dwelling” fires, an additional 6 percent are recorded as “multifamily dwell-
ing/ apartment” fires. “Other residential” fires amount to 3 percent, “non-residential” fires to 7 
percent, and the remaining 6 percent of recorded building fires are either “undetermined”, or no 
further specification is provided in the data. As the data are recorded in GPS format, using latitude 
and longitude, I convert the information of each incident to census tract format. Additional data 
are collected from the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates, produced and pub-
lished by the US Census Bureau for the same period, 2008 – 2012. Detroit consists of 297 census 
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tracts, for 14 of which no data on either the number for median housing income or employment 
status could be obtained.2 Therefore, these census tracts are not part of this analysis. 
2.3.1.2 Model specification 
Three different empirical models are employed to test whether the level of poverty, and, 
more generally speaking, the level of household income, can explain fire risk across Detroit. Model 
F1 uses the number of all building fires per 1000 housing units as the dependent variable. This 
approach is in line with previous literature and provides a general understanding of the correlation. 
I then expand on existing literature by examining only incidents marked as unintentional building 
fires per 1000 housing units, model F2. In so doing, I test whether the level of income plays a 
significant role, or if unintentional fires are much rather explained by random, incident-specific 
reasons and circumstances. Thereafter, I look at the number of intentional fires per 1000 housing 
units, model F3.3 This analysis allows me to investigate whether the risk of arson-related building 
fires changes as a result of increased poverty. All three models are then tested in the form of base-
line models (a), including various socio-economic control variables, and augmented models (b), 
which include additional, housing-specific explanatory variables.  
For each analysis, a simple OLS framework is used to estimate the baseline model. It takes 
the following classic form: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑿) + 𝜖, (42) 
where 𝑦 is the dependent variable, 𝜲 is a vector of all independent variables, and 𝜖 is the random 
error term. Various standard tests are carried out to ensure that the Gauss-Markov assumptions for 
                                                          
2 Census tracts 5167, 5169, 5171, 5172, 5175, 5189, 5208, 5218, 9850, 9851, 9852, 9853, 9855, 9859 are excluded, 
which reduces the number of observed fires by 261. 
3 Due to lack of observations, census tracts 5157, 5156, 5180, 5323, 5386, 5428, 5429, and 5464 had to be dropped 
from the analysis for model F3. 
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unbiased model specification are met. A maximum variance inflation factor-test score of 1.71 in-
dicates that multi-collinearity does not pose a severe problem to the model. A Breusch-Pagan-test 
for homoskedasticity finds no significant evidence for the presence of heteroskedastici-
ty (F1, 1a: 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.06, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.8110; 1b: 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.96, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2, 
= 0.3262) while the White-test suggests that homoskedasticity cannot be assumed for the 
model( F1, 1a: 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 81.80, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.0086; 1b: 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 148.23, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 
> 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.0029). 4 Based on these ambiguous observations, I also use the feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) estimator to test the validity of the results obtained previously. 
Thereafter, I employ spatial lag and spatial error models to control for potential spatial 
autocorrelation. The spatial lag model takes the following standard form (Ward and Skrede 
Gleditsch, 2008):  
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀, (43) 
where 𝑦 is the dependent variable, 𝜌 is the spatial lag parameter, 𝑊 is the calculated weight matrix, 
𝑋 are the independent variables, and 𝜖 is the error term. This model directs the focus of the regres-
sion analysis on the dependent variable. In other words, we are controlling for the effect of the 
number of building fires in one census tract on the number of building fires in another tract. 
Secondly, I estimate a spatial error model of the following form (Ward and Skrede 
Gleditsch, 2008): 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 + 𝜆𝑊𝜉, (44) 
                                                          
4 Similar results are obtained for models 2a, 2b, and F2, F3. 
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where the error term is now decomposed into two separate terms. Again, 𝜀 represents the spatially 
uncorrelated error, while 𝜉 is the spatial factor of the error term, and 𝜆 denotes the spatial depend-
ence parameter. In using this model, no feedback effect between the number of fires in one area 
and any other neighboring area is assumed. The predominant purpose of this estimation is to ac-
count for spatially correlated errors (much like other temporal serial correlation measures), due to 
unobservable features associated with location. 
2.3.1.3 Variable definition 
Table 2 of the appendix summarizes the variables determining the econometric model as 
well as their definitions. All variables are census-tract-specific, and calculated averages for the 
time period between 2008 and 2012. The outcome variables are fires, unintentional fires, and in-
tentional fires. They are constructed as the corresponding log-number of building fires per 1000 
housing units. These variables indicate the risk of fire in a certain geographical area relative to all 
other Detroit areas. Fires is composed of unintentional and intentional fires, but also of all other 
building fires, where no such indication is provided in the data set. Whereas Corcoran et al. (2007) 
propose the use of a negative binomial distribution estimation in case of fire incidents analyses, 
Figures 1-3 of the appendix show that the standardization as well as the log-normalization of the 
dependent variables do not make such a step necessary. 
As far as independent variables are concerned, the model considers various socio-economic 
indicators, and various other housing-related control variables. The main focus of this research lies 
on poverty, which is the percentage of households living below the poverty line (model 1). The 
numbers are based on the ACS “poverty status in the last 12 months” estimates. Depending on 
household size, household composition, and other parameters, dollar value thresholds are calcu-
lated, below which the interviewees are considered to have lived in poverty over the last 12 months. 
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Individual answers are then aggregated for the five-year time period in question. In addition, I use 
the median household income (model 2) to verify previously obtained results. If findings of prior 
research can be confirmed, we would expect a positive correlation between the level of individuals 
living in poverty and the regressand, as well as a negative correlation under the application of the 
median household income variable.  
Secondly, I look at the general unemployment rate, the unemployment rate for the popula-
tion between 16 and 19 years of age, as well as for the population between 20 and 24 years of age. 
Following prior research by Chhetri et al. (2010) , who analyzed socio-economic determinants of 
building fires in Southeast Queensland, I expect to find a positive coefficient for these variables. 
However, Shai (2006) could not find a significant correlation, which makes the outcome less pre-
dictable. Thereafter, I control for the percentage of households living with at least one child under 
18 years of age. This indicator variable has also been used by Chhetri and his colleagues and found 
to be positively correlated with fire risk. Next, I account for the fraction of households with chil-
dren under 18 years of age that are single-parent families. As I would suspect more children ex-
periencing insufficient supervision, this variable might be positively correlated with fire risk. I also 
control for single teenage males between 15 and 17 years old, and young adult single males be-
tween 20 and 24 years old, as a fraction of all males older than 15. These variables may carry 
relevant information, especially when it comes to intentional fires, as there exists an extensive 
literature on the gender gap in crime, some of it suggesting young males to be more likely to 
commit crimes than young females (see, e.g., Steffensmeier and Allan (1996), Kruttschnitt 
(2013)). Finally, I control for the percentage of householders equal to or over the age of 65 living 
in a household by themselves. In general, there seems to be evidence indicating increased risk of 
injury and death for the elderly being exposed to a fire. The federal emergency management agency 
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(FEMA, 2013) estimates the risk for people 65 and over dying in a fire to be 2.7 times higher 
compared to the general public. However, for the purpose of this study, it is also interesting to 
explore whether people over the age of 65 are more prone to experience a fire than others.  
The augmented regression models (b) include an additional four housing-related control 
variables. The first is the median housing unit value, denoted in ten thousands of dollars. I expect 
this variable to be negatively correlated with fire risk. Similarly, I employ the percentage of hous-
ing units built before the year 1939 (housing age). As older housing stock is more likely to exhibit 
dated wiring, and other ailing building materials, I expect a positive coefficient, which Shai (2006) 
also found in her work. Next, I define the percentage of vacant structures out of all housing units. 
Based on prior research, it is not possible to predict the sign of the estimated coefficient. Further-
more, it has to be noted that there is a difference between vacant and abandoned housing, where, 
in the latter case, no owner can be determined. It seems that the transition from vacancy to aban-
doned housing may attract and also be caused by scrappers, squatters, and potentially even arson-
ists. Consequently, fire risk might increase in areas with high levels of vacant structures, but espe-
cially in areas with high levels of abandoned structures. The latter indicator, however, is not ex-
plicitly reported in the ACH data. Nevertheless, Goodman (2013) has successfully used the pro-
vided category “vacant other” as an indicator for the level of abandoned structures in any given 
census tract. Following his interpretation, I use this category to control for abandoned structures. 
It is defined as a percentage of all vacant structures. 
Additional summary statistics for key explanatory variables can be found in the appendix 
of this paper, Table 3. Worth mentioning is the wide spread in poverty and median income between 
census tracts. The estimates for poverty range between 6.2 percent and 79 percent, while the esti-
mates for median household income range between 10,360 dollars and 82,430 dollars. 
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2.3.2 Findings 
2.3.2.1 All building fires (F1) 
Standard OLS regression is employed as a reference (Table 1), to test which variables are able to 
predict the number of all building fires in any given Detroit census tract between 2008 and 2012. 
Model (1) uses poverty as the indicator for fire risk, while model (2) uses the median income as a 
more general approach to assess the relationship between income and fire risk. The estimated val-
ues of the baseline model (a), without housing-specific control variables, are reported in parenthe-
ses. I find mixed evidence for the level of significance of individual variables. Furthermore, not 
all results are in line with previous literature. The 𝑅2-value suggests that the model is capable of 
explaining between 34 and 53.3 percent of the variance, while the use of poverty as an indicator 
variable returns slightly higher values than median income. Overall, the 𝑅2-value seems accepta-
ble, given the fact that we are dealing with noisy micro data. 
As previous literature predicts, I find that being poor influences fire risk. The estimated 
coefficient suggests that a one percentage point increase in the rate of families living below the 
poverty line increases the number of fires in any given census tract by 0.66 (1.64) percent. The 
result is statistically significant at least at a 95 percent confidence interval. A similar conclusion 
can be drawn employing the level of median income. In this instance, OLS estimates the number 
of fires to increase by 1.9 percent for every $1,000 drop in median income. This estimate is sig-
nificant at a 99 percent confidence interval. Adjusted for housing-specific variables, the estimate 
drops to 1.0 percent for every $1,000 drop in median income.  
The rate of unemployment appears to be strongly positively connected to fire risk, where a 
one percentage point increase in unemployment causes a one percent increase in fire risk. This 
result is in line with previous literature (Chhetri et al., 2010). However, the effect disappears after 
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introducing housing-specific variables to the model. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the 
estimation regarding the rate of teenage unemployment, except that the estimate is still marginally 
significant in model (b). Model (2) finds teenage unemployment to be significant at least at a 95 
percent interval. Conversely, unemployment among 20- to 24-year-olds does not seem to have a 
measurable effect on fire risk. Families with children under the age of 18 years face a higher fire 
risk than their “childless” counterparts. A one percentage point increase in the rate of families with 
children is predicted to increase the number of fires anywhere between 0.89 (1.02) and 1.60 (1.24) 
percent. This result is in line with previous literature. The fraction of single parents among families 
with children doesn’t seem significantly to influence fire risk. Census tracts with a higher ratio of 
single male teens appear to be more prone to experience a building fire than others. This effect 
disappears once the model is adjusted for aspects of housing. Areas with a higher number of single 
householders above the age of 65 years face a much lower fire risk than others. According to every 
estimation, an increase of one percentage point in the population of single householders above the 
age of 65 years is translated to a 2.36 (2.24) - 2.43 (2.65) percent lower occurrence of building 
fires.  
There is strong evidence that quality of housing units indicated by housing value and age 
of housing stock significantly influences fire risk. As already suspected and estimated in prior 
studies, I find a negative correlation between the value of the housing unit and the number of fires. 
The opposite holds true for the correlation between housing age and the number of fires. Further-
more, I find a significantly positive relationship between the rate of vacant buildings and the risk 
of fire. The same can be recorded with regard to the rate of abandoned structures in a census tract. 
Although the estimated coefficient is smaller than in the case of vacant structures (0.86 – 1.19), 
the positive coefficient suggests that fire risk increases as the share of abandoned structures among 
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vacant structures rises. Abandoned structures may still be “used” in one risky way or another, 
although not officially or legally, which would explain the positive coefficient. 
I then employ a FGLS strategy to account for potential heteroskedasticity in the model 
(Table 1). As a result, the 𝑅2-value improves slightly to 0.38 – 0.58. With the exception of unem-
ployment among 20- to 24-year-olds, the signs of the estimated coefficients stay the same, while 
their magnitude changes slightly. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, census tracts are 
now estimated to face a 0.60 (1.51) percent increase in fires for every percentage point increase in 
households living below the poverty line. A slightly higher standard error of 0.27 corresponds to 
a 99 percent confidence interval. Similarly, I find that a $1,000 increase in median income reduces 
the number of fires by 2 percent, a marginal change of 0.1 percentage points compared to the OLS 
estimator. The estimation is highly significant both for the base line and augmented model. The 
level of unemployment is now at least marginally significant; however, the prediction power of 
teenage unemployment is slightly lower compared to OLS. The estimations for families with chil-
dren, single parents, single householders above the age of 65 years, housing value, housing age, 
and the vacancy rate are all still significant at least at a 95 percent interval. In this setup, the level 
of abandonment does not carry statistically important information regarding the level of fire risk.  
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Table 1: F1 All building fires; OLS and FGLS 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS 
         
poverty 1.642*** 0.656**   1.509*** 0.595**   
 (0.284) (0.266)   (0.297) (0.270)   
median income   -0.0185*** -0.0103***   -0.0200*** -0.0158*** 
   (0.00342) (0.00348)   (0.00257) (0.00265) 
unemployment 1.090*** 0.576 1.149*** 0.822** 1.351*** 0.625* 1.086*** 0.769** 
 (0.406) (0.353) (0.408) (0.385) (0.398) (0.336) (0.372) (0.350) 
unempl 16-19 0.289*** 0.161* 0.291*** 0.229** 0.220** 0.167* 0.229** 0.221** 
 (0.104) (0.0912) (0.105) (0.0997) (0.102) (0.0861) (0.0961) (0.0866) 
unempl 20-24 -0.00661 -0.00642 0.0539 0.0984 -0.0555 0.0775 -0.0792 0.111 
 (0.136) (0.117) (0.137) (0.128) (0.133) (0.111) (0.131) (0.114) 
child 1.019*** 0.884** 1.244*** 1.595*** 0.994** 1.025*** 0.865** 1.028*** 
 (0.383) (0.348) (0.382) (0.366) (0.394) (0.357) (0.353) (0.353) 
single parents 0.0723 0.0340 -0.0377 0.160 0.0288 0.0592 -0.168 0.0289 
 (0.175) (0.162) (0.179) (0.179) (0.191) (0.165) (0.178) (0.189) 
single m 15-17 2.543* 1.500 2.023 1.538 1.868 0.589 0.945 0.438 
 (1.477) (1.283) (1.483) (1.403) (1.449) (1.333) (1.416) (1.400) 
single m 18-24 0.531 0.674 0.340 -0.285 1.257 0.982 1.044 0.650 
 (1.194) (1.033) (1.205) (1.130) (1.212) (1.117) (1.291) (1.256) 
age 65 -2.243*** -2.360*** -2.648*** -2.427*** -2.449*** -2.564*** -2.897*** -2.890*** 
 (0.647) (0.556) (0.663) (0.623) (0.626) (0.547) (0.671) (0.636) 
housing value  -0.0774***    -0.0766***   
  (0.0105)    (0.0124)   
housing age  0.505***  0.499***  0.594***  0.535*** 
  (0.154)  (0.169)  (0.160)  (0.166) 
vacancy  0.862***  1.186***  0.951***  1.263*** 
  (0.315)  (0.349)  (0.292)  (0.316) 
abandonment  0.254*  0.301**  0.0960  0.149 
  (0.138)  (0.152)  (0.129)  (0.127) 
         
Constant 2.838*** 3.443*** 4.036*** 2.996*** 2.920*** 3.428*** 4.421*** 3.540*** 
 (0.205) (0.242) (0.272) (0.298) (0.206) (0.240) (0.276) (0.298) 
         
Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
R-squared 0.349 0.533 0.340 0.434 0.381 0.532 0.472 0.584 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Based on these findings, I visually inspect the data for possible spatial autocorrelation, a 
phenomenon that has attracted increasing attention over the last several years (see, e.g., Asgary et 
al. (2010), Chhetri et al. (2010), Corcoran et al. (2007, 2011), Higgins et al. (2013)). The idea is 
that fires may not be distributed uniformly across any given space, in this example, Detroit. It 
might rather be the case that certain “hotspots” exist which may likely not be limited to the bound-
ary of a census tract. Consequently, we may experience spatial spillover effects which have to be 
accounted for. Map 6 shows a kernel density methodology regarding the distribution of all building 
48 
 
 
fires across Detroit. The visualization reveals that, indeed, hotspots exist. Predominantly, cluster-
ing of high fire risk areas can be found in the southwest, northeast, north, and, to some extent, in 
the northwest of the city. There is also evidence that high fire density areas cause spillover effects 
in surrounding areas, where spillovers seem to die out slowly, the greater the distance from the 
center of a hotspot area becomes.  
On the basis of these first observations, it seems necessary to account for spatial correlation 
using spatial regression techniques. In order to do so, I use geocoded internal points, or centroids, 
of census tracts, collected from the 2010 Census Gazetteer Files. This information allows me to 
calculate a row-standardized spatial weight matrix, 𝑊, based on distance 𝑑𝑖𝑗 for observations 𝑖, 𝑗. 
This matrix attributes lower weights the further observations 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 are spatially apart from each 
other. In order to choose the maximum bandwidth for 𝑑𝑖𝑗, meaning that no spatial effects are as-
sumed to be present for a distance greater than 𝐷, I refer back to Map 6. It seems that with a 
diameter of about five miles, the largest cluster prevails in the northeastern part of the city. Various 
values of 𝑑𝑖𝑗, anywhere between two miles, the minimum value allowing every tract to have a 
neighbor, and 18.6 miles, the maximum recorded distance, have been tested. While the estimated 
z-values, as well as the coefficients, decrease in absolute terms the smaller the distance band be-
comes, the level of significance of the individual independent variables does not change. Based on 
the maximum bandwidth of 5 miles, the weight matrix is calculated and the fitted OLS regression 
is tested for spatial dependence. With a Moran’s I of at least 9.833 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000), and a 
Lagrange multiplier of at least 56.944 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000) (Model (2): 10.195 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
0.000), and a Lagrange multiplier of 61.003 (p-value=0.000)), the initial suspicion is confirmed, 
and there is strong evidence justifying the use of a spatial regression model.  
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Map 6: Spatial distribution of building fires in Detroit 2008 - 2012 
 
Table 2 shows the estimations for the spatial lag model. Since the previous analysis has 
shown that heteroskedasticity cannot be disregarded, the estimation is carried out using robust 
standard errors. The variation ratio is indicated to lie between 0.48 and 0.57 (0.40 and 0.41). As 
expected, most estimated coefficients as well as the corresponding z-statistics are now lower than 
before the spatial adjustment. This makes sense intuitively, as OLS previously may have overesti-
mated the influence of the independent variables where no spatial parameter was present. Unem-
ployment is now estimated to be 0.90 at a 95 percent confidence interval. Teenage unemployment 
is now only marginally significant in the baseline model, and not statistically significant in the 
augmented model. The baseline estimate of families with children is not significant anymore, ei-
ther. Only the vacancy rate has gained slightly both in terms of its coefficient and its level of 
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significance, whereas the level of abandonment has lost its statistical importance. The signs of the 
coefficients have not changed.  
The poverty indicator is still highly significant and estimated to increase the number of 
fires by 0.60 (1.46) percent for each percentage point increase in poverty. With -0.009 (-0.017), 
the coefficient of the median income has only changed ever so slightly. The new lag variable rho 
is significant at a 99 percent interval with an estimated coefficient of at least 0.62. This result 
indicates that a high fire risk in one area increases the fire risk of a neighboring area.  
Table 2 also exhibits the estimated results for the spatial error model. The variation within 
the variance ratio estimations is now higher than in the spatial lag model (0.50 – 0.58 (0.23 – 
0.24)). The level of poverty per tract is still highly significant, where the coefficient of 0.89 (1.50) 
is slightly higher than in the spatial lag model. The estimated coefficient of the median income is 
also statistically significant with an estimated coefficient of -0.014 (-0.017). The level of vacant 
structures, and the rate of abandoned structures among them, is now significant, at least at a 95 
percent interval. All other estimates are comparable to the spatial lag model, yet the estimated 
coefficients vary. The spatial error parameter lambda is estimated to be at least 0.87 and is signif-
icant at a 99 percent confidence level, indicating that spatially correlated errors exist. 
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Table 2: F1 All building fires; Spatial Lag and Spatial Error 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
VARIABLES LAG LAG LAG LAG ERR ERR ERR ERR 
         
poverty 1.459*** 0.597**   1.504*** 0.894***   
 (0.278) (0.270)   (0.303) (0.274)   
median income   -0.0165*** 
(0.00322) 
-0.00926*** 
(0.00326) 
  -0.0174*** 
(0.00353) 
-0.0144*** 
(0.00361) 
unemployment 0.896** 0.481 0.946** 0.699* 0.857** 0.228 0.867* 0.388 
 (0.411) (0.365) (0.426) (0.406) (0.429) (0.350) (0.449) (0.398) 
unempl 16-19 0.191* 0.114 0.192* 0.170* 0.193* 0.0974 0.194* 0.150* 
 (0.0991) (0.0900) (0.101) (0.0916) (0.101) (0.0821) (0.103) (0.0860) 
unempl 20-24 -0.0301 -0.0230 0.0235 0.0708 -0.0319 -0.0383 0.0219 0.0725 
 (0.131) (0.106) (0.132) (0.121) (0.131) (0.102) (0.131) (0.115) 
child 0.686 0.678* 0.883** 1.307*** 0.573 0.470 0.809* 0.987** 
 (0.445) (0.377) (0.431) (0.381) (0.484) (0.387) (0.466) (0.402) 
single parents 0.0572 0.0152 -0.0408 0.131 0.0915 0.0105 -0.0265 0.0943 
 (0.200) (0.185) (0.208) (0.196) (0.210) (0.184) (0.220) (0.196) 
single m 15-17 2.354 1.178 1.890 1.177 2.529 1.257 2.088 1.171 
 (1.905) (1.324) (1.908) (1.524) (1.880) (1.312) (1.892) (1.529) 
single m 18-24 0.326 0.436 0.155 -0.472 0.631 0.690 0.443 -0.144 
 (1.316) (1.065) (1.395) (1.261) (1.298) (1.000) (1.384) (1.163) 
age 65 -1.720*** -1.950*** -2.077*** -1.955*** -1.997*** -1.698*** -2.376*** -1.781*** 
 (0.633) (0.563) (0.662) (0.629) (0.676) (0.540) (0.708) (0.609) 
housing value  -0.0719***    -0.0703***   
  (0.0154)    (0.0130)   
housing age  0.454***  0.441**  0.886***  0.960*** 
  (0.157)  (0.175)  (0.203)  (0.230) 
vacancy  0.950***  1.263***  1.074***  1.305*** 
  (0.302)  (0.372)  (0.306)  (0.375) 
abandonment  0.0461  0.0654  0.396**  0.415*** 
  (0.141)  (0.130)  (0.163)  (0.159) 
Constant -0.0972 1.067** 0.944* 0.359 3.064*** 3.379*** 4.183*** 3.345*** 
 (0.441) (0.452) (0.525) (0.506) (0.346) (0.505) (0.461) (0.667) 
rho 0.762*** 0.618*** 0.768*** 0.691***     
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107)     
lambda     0.874*** 
(0.0959) 
0.937*** 
(0.0551) 
0.876*** 
(0.0927) 
0.946*** 
(0.0489) 
         
Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
Variance ratio 0.407 0.566 0.400 0.476 0.238 0.575 0.232 0.496 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.3.2.2 Unintentional building fires (F2) 
This section of the analysis specifically investigates unintentional building fires, in other 
words, building fires where firefighters were able to rule out all other causes of ignition with cer-
tainty. As a result, only about 11.5 percent of all recorded data between 2008 and 2012 fall into 
this category and are part of the approximation. The estimated adjusted 𝑅2-values are lower than 
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in the previous regressions and range between 0.11 and 0.20. The estimation results also change 
substantially, once the dependent variable is narrowed down to just unintentional fires.  
None of the four estimated models presented in Table 3 finds evidence for a significant 
correlation between poverty and fire risk, or the median income level and fire risk. However puz-
zling this result may seem at first glance, as it shows a very different outcome compared to prior 
studies, it makes sense intuitively, taking into account that these studies do not distinguish between 
different types of building fires. On second thought, it is hard to come up with a plausible reason 
that people living in poverty should be more prone to experience an unintentional fire than others, 
once the model is controlled for various socio-economic and other housing factors, as, by defini-
tion, unintentional fires happen more randomly than intentional fires.  
Only four explanatory variables are consistently estimated to have significant impact on 
unintentional fire risk. First of all, this includes single parents. The estimates suggest that, for a 
one percentage point increase in the number of single parents, fire risk increases by 0.38 (0.45) 
percent, significant at least at a 95 percent interval. One explanation for this result might be given 
by the hypothesis raised earlier, in that single parents might find it harder to supervise their children 
than two-parent families. However, the estimation is weaker using the FGLS estimator. The rate 
of single males between 18 and 24 years old also appears to be positively correlated with fire risk, 
although mostly only at a marginal level of significance. Similar to the previous analysis, I find 
that areas with more single householders above the age of 65 years are less likely to experience an 
unintentional fire. The estimated coefficients are now slightly smaller than before. Finally, housing 
value is now strongly negatively correlated with unintentional fire risk. The estimations suggest 
that an increase in value by $10,000 decreases unintentional fire risk by between 0.04 and 0.06 
percent. 
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Table 3: F2 Unintentional building fires; OLS and FGLS 
 (1a) (2b) (1a) (2b) (1a) (2b) (1a) (2b) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS 
         
poverty -0.0742 -0.275   -0.122 -0.295   
 (0.250) (0.268)   (0.254) (0.250)   
median income   0.00285 0.00358   0.00193 0.00396 
   (0.00299) (0.00329)   (0.00286) (0.00283) 
unemployment 0.269 0.153 0.355 0.329 0.277 0.216 0.191 0.0422 
 (0.358) (0.356) (0.357) (0.363) (0.349) (0.324) (0.347) (0.334) 
unempl 16-19 0.0806 0.0417 0.0780 0.0742 -0.0350 -0.0476 -0.0168 -0.0168 
 (0.0918) (0.0920) (0.0917) (0.0940) (0.0890) (0.0858) (0.0883) (0.0881) 
unempl 20-24 0.180 0.148 0.173 0.178 0.183* 0.122 0.180 0.171 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.120) (0.121) (0.110) (0.100) (0.111) (0.107) 
child 0.0308 -0.264 0.0304 0.0680 -0.379 -0.498 -0.453 -0.419 
 (0.337) (0.351) (0.334) (0.345) (0.344) (0.316) (0.335) (0.321) 
single parents 0.451*** 0.378** 0.477*** 0.503*** 0.292* 0.334** 0.340* 0.416** 
 (0.154) (0.164) (0.157) (0.169) (0.174) (0.162) (0.175) (0.181) 
single m 15-17 0.700 0.472 0.720 0.659 1.091 -0.310 1.315 0.884 
 (1.300) (1.295) (1.296) (1.323) (1.159) (0.828) (1.217) (1.053) 
single m 18-24 1.882* 2.312** 1.949* 1.882* 1.920* 1.762* 2.182* 1.522 
 (1.052) (1.043) (1.053) (1.065) (1.136) (0.981) (1.143) (1.117) 
age 65 -2.097*** -2.202*** -2.000*** -1.990*** -2.426*** -2.465*** -2.341*** -2.132*** 
 (0.570) (0.561) (0.579) (0.588) (0.566) (0.511) (0.582) (0.566) 
housing value  -0.0431***    -0.0559***   
  (0.0106)    (0.0122)   
housing age  0.0899  0.0676  0.0257  0.0182 
  (0.156)  (0.159)  (0.134)  (0.144) 
vacancy  -0.185  0.0940  -0.0272  0.325 
  (0.318)  (0.329)  (0.285)  (0.315) 
abandonment  -0.0136  0.0149  -0.132  0.0169 
  (0.139)  (0.143)  (0.125)  (0.134) 
         
Constant 1.662*** 2.240*** 1.502*** 1.403*** 1.998*** 2.590*** 1.871*** 1.705*** 
 (0.181) (0.244) (0.237) (0.281) (0.188) (0.235) (0.259) (0.287) 
         
Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
R-squared 0.125 0.177 0.128 0.129 0.121 0.200 0.119 0.115 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As in the previous analysis, I test the data for spatial autocorrelation. With a Moran’s I of 
at least 5.495 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000), and a Lagrange multiplier of 15.970 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000) 
(Model b: 4. 953 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000), a Lagrange multiplier of 12.483 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000)), 
we can reject the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation, and the use of a spatial regression model 
is justified.  
Map 7 allows a closer visual examination of the unintentional building fire distribution in 
Detroit between 2008 and 2012. By comparing Map 6 to Map 7, we can see that the distribution 
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is substantially different, and that a clear pattern is now harder to identify. It seems that fires are 
more randomly scattered across the city and that hotspots are now more numerous, yet mostly not 
as severe as before. There is also evidence for spillover effects from high frequency areas to adja-
cent areas, but only to a smaller extent than before. Again, the map gives the impression that fewer 
fires happen in the midtown and downtown areas along the Woodward corridor and Jefferson Av-
enue, respectively. Neighborhoods on the west side, and especially on the east side, appear to see 
more unintentional building fires than other areas.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the spatial lag and the spatial error models. The 
variation ratio is now between 0.08 and 0.21, and smaller than before. None of the regression 
models finds a significant correlation between poverty, or median income, and the risk of uninten-
tional building fires. The signs of the coefficients are consistent and their magnitude is slightly 
smaller compared to the models without spatial adjustment. As before, the estimation finds signif-
icant correlations between single parents, single males between 18 and 24, single residents above 
65, housing value, and fire risk.  
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Map 7: Spatial distribution of unintentional building fires in Detroit 2008 - 2012 
 
In addition, both spatial models find that old housing stock positively influences the risk of an 
unintentional building fire. The spatial error model, for instance, predicts an increase in fire risk 
of 0.58 percent for every one percentage point increase in the share of old housing stock. The 
spatial parameters, rho and lambda, are estimated to be positively significant at a 99 percent con-
fidence interval. However, the coefficients of lambda are consistently smaller than before. 
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Table 4: F2 Unintentional fires; Spatial Lag and Spatial Error 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
VARIABLES LAG LAG LAG LAG ERR ERR ERR ERR 
         
poverty 0.123 -0.126   0.245 0.131   
 (0.243) (0.264)   (0.273) (0.274)   
median income   0.000151 0.00112   -0.00121 -0.00272 
   (0.00313) (0.00343)   (0.00359) (0.00384) 
unemployment 0.0979 -0.0396 0.172 0.117 0.0487 -0.207 0.122 -0.0730 
 (0.347) (0.339) (0.375) (0.381) (0.359) (0.337) (0.391) (0.386) 
unempl 16-19 0.0594 0.0206 0.0583 0.0544 0.0603 0.0177 0.0585 0.0473 
 (0.0844) (0.0892) (0.0842) (0.0842) (0.0859) (0.0860) (0.0858) (0.0823) 
unempl 20-24 0.130 0.109 0.132 0.145 0.108 0.0808 0.117 0.131 
 (0.109) (0.100) (0.110) (0.108) (0.109) (0.0971) (0.109) (0.104) 
child -0.158 -0.397 -0.130 -0.0601 -0.252 -0.512 -0.200 -0.245 
 (0.393) (0.385) (0.397) (0.398) (0.428) (0.402) (0.430) (0.429) 
single parents 0.338* 0.324** 0.349** 0.432** 0.317* 0.304* 0.322* 0.391** 
 (0.174) (0.162) (0.174) (0.174) (0.180) (0.165) (0.181) (0.178) 
single m 15-17 0.350 -0.0463 0.320 0.113 0.325 -0.132 0.278 -0.0587 
 (1.209) (1.110) (1.212) (1.199) (1.197) (1.058) (1.197) (1.153) 
single m 18-24 1.821* 2.116** 1.852* 1.672 1.864* 2.106** 1.867* 1.672 
 (1.087) (1.066) (1.093) (1.084) (1.073) (1.037) (1.087) (1.052) 
age 65 -1.785*** -1.904*** -1.764*** -1.769*** -1.806*** -1.741*** -1.815*** -1.654*** 
 (0.594) (0.572) (0.602) (0.596) (0.620) (0.575) (0.633) (0.604) 
housing value  -0.0422**    -0.0419***   
  (0.0168)    (0.0153)   
housing age  0.280*  0.259  0.575**  0.578** 
  (0.161)  (0.166)  (0.230)  (0.246) 
vacancy  -0.178  0.0619  -0.192  0.00841 
  (0.317)  (0.346)  (0.326)  (0.359) 
abandonment  -0.0289  -0.00189  0.166  0.172 
  (0.142)  (0.135)  (0.169)  (0.161) 
Constant 0.428 0.763* 0.467 0.112 1.775*** 2.030*** 1.867*** 1.632*** 
 (0.345) (0.409) (0.342) (0.372) (0.248) (0.377) (0.299) (0.390) 
rho 0.659*** 0.734*** 0.642*** 0.725***     
 (0.139) (0.128) (0.141) (0.137)     
lambda     0.740*** 0.891*** 0.723*** 0.893*** 
     (0.152) (0.0925) (0.160) (0.0943) 
         
Observations 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
Variance ratio 0.154 0.207 0.154 0.158 0.077 0.189 0.076 0.138 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.3.2.3 Intentional building fires (F3) 
After the overall not very fruitful, yet revealing, analysis of unintentional building fires, it 
is now interesting to investigate whether poverty can be a valid predictor of intentional, or, in other 
words, crime-related building fires. Together, these incidents account for about 12 percent of all 
building fires in Detroit during the period between 2008 and 2012. There is strong evidence, how-
ever, that the real number is significantly higher, as, for many building fires, the cause of ignition 
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was still under investigation at the time the incident was recorded. These fires are marked “cause 
under investigation”. That means that arson was highly suspected as the cause of the building fire, 
even though it had not been proven at that point of the investigation. By changing the outcome 
variable to intentional fires, and keeping the explanatory variables unchanged, I am able to inves-
tigate the causal determinants of these fires more carefully than previous literature was able to do.  
The analysis is carried out for 275 census tracts, as eight had to be dropped due to lack of 
observations. Again, I use a standard OLS multiple regression as a reference point (see Table 5 for 
details). The first thing to notice is that with values between 0.24 and 0.38, the 𝑅2-value is now 
higher as in the regression regarding unintentional building fires. Most importantly, the estimated 
coefficients of poverty are highest among the three different dependent variables. A one percentage 
point increase in poverty is predicted to lead to a 0.9 (2.0) percent increase in intentional building 
fires, significant at least at a 95 percent confidence interval. Similarly, a $1,000 increase in the 
median income causes a 1.8 (2.6) percent drop in the number of intentional building fires, signifi-
cant at a 99 percent confidence interval. With a value of at least 1.27 (1.74), the level of overall 
unemployment has by far the highest impact on fire risk across F1 to F3. The fraction of families 
with children is again positively correlated with intentional fire risk, and strongly significant. An-
other interesting difference compared to the earlier regression analyses is that the share of elderly 
single householders is now only marginally significant at best, while the absolute value of its co-
efficient has decreased. The highly significant housing value and housing age specific coefficients 
have increased in absolute terms, compared to previous estimations; however, the level of vacancy 
and abandonment is not statistically significant anymore. Especially the latter result is somewhat 
surprising, as many of the arson- related fires occur in vacant, and especially abandoned, struc-
tures. 
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The FGLS estimation method delivers similar results to the OLS estimator, at least with 
respect to poverty and median income. The effect of poverty is now calculated to be 1.01 (2.10) 
percent, while median income accounts for a 2.0 (2.8) percent change. These are the highest coef-
ficients measured among FGLS estimates. The effect of overall unemployment is strongly signif-
icant, and, with values of at least 1.18 percent, also the highest among the three models. The same 
assessment can be given to the absolute values of the housing value and housing age coefficients. 
The vacancy level is now significant, at least at a 95 percent confidence interval, and estimated to 
move in the same direction as fire risk. According to the estimates, a one percentage point increase 
in the level of vacancy now causes an increase in the number of fires between 1.17 and 1.50 per-
cent. The coefficient of abandoned housing has increased slightly; however, the estimation is still 
far from significant. 
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Table 5: F3 Intentional building fires; OLS and FGLS 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS 
         
poverty 2.000*** 0.900**   2.102*** 1.006**   
 (0.420) (0.415)   (0.432) (0.413)   
median income   -0.0264*** -0.0179***   -0.0281*** -0.0200*** 
   (0.00504) (0.00533)   (0.00450) (0.00450) 
unemployment 1.864*** 1.266** 1.736*** 1.518*** 2.037*** 1.179** 1.795*** 1.343** 
 (0.588) (0.544) (0.586) (0.574) (0.572) (0.554) (0.580) (0.552) 
unempl 16-19 -0.0971 -0.206 -0.0926 -0.123 -0.267* -0.304** -0.312** -0.241* 
 (0.152) (0.141) (0.150) (0.148) (0.145) (0.138) (0.146) (0.139) 
unempl 20-24 -0.0816 -0.0599 0.00846 0.0632 0.0246 0.0580 0.0765 0.224 
 (0.197) (0.180) (0.195) (0.190) (0.188) (0.171) (0.188) (0.176) 
child 1.324** 1.243** 1.643*** 2.002*** 0.726 1.056* 0.876 1.788*** 
 (0.568) (0.541) (0.559) (0.556) (0.590) (0.542) (0.583) (0.551) 
single parents 0.00536 -0.0183 -0.139 0.103 -0.226 -0.124 -0.501 -0.0755 
 (0.259) (0.253) (0.259) (0.267) (0.303) (0.280) (0.307) (0.289) 
single m 15-17 3.127 1.855 2.490 1.804 4.868*** 2.776* 3.620** 1.255 
 (2.136) (1.972) (2.114) (2.078) (1.681) (1.545) (1.740) (1.813) 
single m 18-24 0.534 0.310 0.359 -0.534 -0.375 -0.589 0.202 -1.110 
 (1.765) (1.620) (1.752) (1.710) (1.874) (1.636) (1.895) (1.736) 
age 65 -1.317 -1.526* -1.816* -1.774* -1.793** -1.571* -2.328** -2.105** 
 (0.955) (0.873) (0.960) (0.939) (0.897) (0.865) (0.912) (0.938) 
housing value  -0.102***    -0.106***   
  (0.0170)    (0.0186)   
housing age  0.676***  0.691***  0.764***  0.696*** 
  (0.238)  (0.251)  (0.227)  (0.239) 
vacancy  0.877*  1.125**  1.170**  1.495*** 
  (0.485)  (0.517)  (0.485)  (0.502) 
abandonment  0.0686  0.0964  0.0305  -0.138 
  (0.215)  (0.227)  (0.204)  (0.213) 
         
Constant 0.346 1.195*** 1.953*** 0.927** 0.676** 1.256*** 2.588*** 1.328*** 
 (0.315) (0.380) (0.390) (0.443) (0.329) (0.392) (0.454) (0.467) 
         
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
R-squared 0.237 0.383 0.250 0.305 0.279 0.424 0.323 0.376 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Map 8: Spatial distribution of intentional building fires in Detroit 2008 - 2012 
 
With a Moran’s I of at least 5.663 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000), and a Lagrange multiplier 
of 17.151 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000) (Model b: 6.180 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000), a Lagrange multiplier of 
20.629 (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.000)), there is strong evidence that the use of a spatial regression model 
is also justified in case of intentional building fires. Map 8 graphically illustrates the distribution 
of intentional building fires across Detroit. The patterns appear very different compared to the 
density map of unintentional fires. It is now obvious that intentional fires are heavily clustered in 
only a few areas of Detroit. These areas can be found in the west, the southwest, north of Highland 
Park, and, to a minor extent, on the east side of Detroit.  
Table 6 present the results for both spatial regression models. With a value between 0.90 
(1.94), and 1.34 (2.05), both spatial lag and spatial error models estimate a very strong and highly 
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significant correlation between poverty and intentional fire risk. Similar to this result, the coeffi-
cient of median income is significant at a 99 percent interval, and its value ranges between -0.018 
(-0.026) and -0.025 (-0.029). Both spatial regression models estimate a significant correlation for 
housing value, housing age, and vacancy rate. In addition, the spatial error model reports a signif-
icant effect of the level of abandonment, according to which a one percentage point increase in 
abandoned housing leads to a 0.57 (0.59) percent increase in intentional building fire risk. Again, 
the spatial parameters, rho and lambda, are estimated to be positively significant at a 99 percent 
confidence interval. The coefficients of lambda are now slightly higher than in the previous anal-
ysis, emphasizing the importance of the spatial setting.  
In summary, all variations of regressions, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, spatial interac-
tion of the dependent variables, as well as spatial autocorrelation, find strong evidence for the 
positive correlation between poverty and fire risk. Furthermore, all variations of regressions find 
strong evidence for the negative correlation between median household income and fire risk. This 
seems to hold true for building fires in general and for intentional fires in particular. No such 
conclusion can be drawn easily for the influence of vacant and abandoned structures on fire risk, 
as their influence on the dependent variables is not consistent across all different types of analyses. 
If anything, then the prediction power seems to be greater with regard to intentional building fires 
when adjusted for spatial autocorrelation. 
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Table 6: F3 Intentional fires; Spatial Lag and Spatial Error 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
VARIABLES LAG LAG LAG LAG ERR ERR ERR ERR 
         
poverty 1.935*** 0.901**   2.051*** 1.335***   
 (0.407) (0.407)   (0.439) (0.426)   
median income   -0.0259*** -0.0178***   -0.0286*** -0.0252*** 
   (0.00483) (0.00499)   (0.00524) (0.00552) 
unemployment 1.702*** 1.167** 1.561*** 1.370** 1.698*** 0.831 1.462** 0.937 
 (0.594) (0.555) (0.605) (0.587) (0.613) (0.531) (0.632) (0.572) 
unempl 16-19 -0.153 -0.236* -0.149 -0.164 -0.115 -0.217* -0.112 -0.144 
 (0.151) (0.139) (0.151) (0.145) (0.152) (0.125) (0.152) (0.133) 
unempl 20-24 -0.0792 -0.0572 0.00896 0.0615 -0.0614 -0.0512 0.0277 0.0898 
 (0.192) (0.164) (0.189) (0.176) (0.191) (0.161) (0.186) (0.168) 
child 1.141** 1.149** 1.446** 1.844*** 1.092* 0.976* 1.461** 1.586*** 
 (0.578) (0.494) (0.561) (0.520) (0.595) (0.517) (0.576) (0.534) 
single parents 0.0305 -0.00370 -0.111 0.106 0.113 0.00655 -0.0725 0.0760 
 (0.288) (0.272) (0.292) (0.285) (0.296) (0.267) (0.304) (0.276) 
single m 15-17 2.972 1.657 2.355 1.557 3.220 1.945 2.540 1.641 
 (2.413) (1.843) (2.404) (2.015) (2.392) (1.751) (2.415) (1.984) 
single m 18-24 0.618 0.342 0.442 -0.444 1.147 0.841 0.968 0.0459 
 (1.863) (1.632) (1.936) (1.839) (1.862) (1.562) (1.928) (1.758) 
age 65 -1.031 -1.282 -1.520* -1.490* -1.463 -1.230 -1.995** -1.517* 
 (0.899) (0.829) (0.890) (0.889) (0.941) (0.805) (0.937) (0.876) 
housing value  -0.0962***    -0.0987***   
  (0.0169)    (0.0133)   
housing age  0.621***  0.625**  1.199***  1.325*** 
  (0.225)  (0.249)  (0.290)  (0.333) 
vacancy  0.980**  1.216**  1.184**  1.324** 
  (0.474)  (0.541)  (0.468)  (0.537) 
abandonment  -0.0189  -0.0114  0.587**  0.572** 
  (0.203)  (0.203)  (0.235)  (0.245) 
Constant -0.923** 0.143 0.625 -0.253 0.332 0.686 2.067*** 0.985 
 (0.455) (0.530) (0.534) (0.545) (0.420) (0.632) (0.525) (0.733) 
rho 0.695*** 0.553*** 0.708*** 0.666***     
 (0.167) (0.192) (0.161) (0.175)     
lambda     0.764*** 0.910*** 0.792*** 0.921*** 
     (0.153) (0.0740) (0.140) (0.0675) 
         
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
Variance ratio 0.252 0.391 0.264 0.317 0.229 0.583 0.248 0.522 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4 Discussion 
The previous analysis raises many questions, carries policy implications for the city of 
Detroit, and potentially also for other cities that deal with similar problems. It also leaves room for 
extensive future research, especially in the field of economics. I would like to address briefly only 
two of these issues.  
First, if this analysis has demonstrated one thing, it is that poverty, and especially inten-
tional building fires, are closely linked together. Intentional building fires account for 12 percent 
of all building fires over the observed period. If “suspicious” building fires were added to that 
fraction, in other words, fires in cases where arson was highly suspected at the point of investiga-
tion when the data were recorded but could not be proven, then the number would increase to 40 
percent of all building fires. Therefore, more emphasis on arson investigation, but also a better 
understanding of the determinants of intentional fires, followed by counteracting measures to pre-
vent them from happening in the first place, may potentially decrease the overall number of build-
ing fires dramatically.  
Second, from an economic standpoint, these findings call for a theoretical framework to 
determine the value of urban fire service, as this area of research has been largely neglected up to 
this point. By that I mean a framework not only in terms of insurance claims, or from a business 
perspective with regard to the forgone contribution towards productivity, but in a more general 
sense with a focus on individual utility and social well-being.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the correlation between poverty, median income, and fire risk in an 
urban environment. In line with previous literature, I find relatively small, yet persistent, effects. 
A one percentage point increase in the number of households living below the poverty line trans-
lates to a 0.60 and 1.64 percent increase in the number of building fires. By focusing only on 
intentional fires, the effect rises to 0.90 – 2.10 percent. I also find that a decrease of $1,000 in the 
level of median income corresponds to a 1.03 – 2.00 percent increase in building fires, and to a 
1.78 – 2.86 percent increase in intentional building fires. These findings stand in sharp contrast to 
the estimations for unintentional building fires, where no significant correlation between poverty, 
median income, and fire risk can be recorded. Furthermore, I find ambiguous estimations for the 
effect of vacant and abandoned housing. However, there is some evidence that both are positively 
affecting fire risk. Finally, there is strong evidence that fires are clustered and that spatial autocor-
relation has to be adjusted for. 
More research in the field of economics, both empirically and theoretically, is needed to 
understand better the cause of fires in an urban environment, their economic implications, and 
ways to counteract, or better still, to prevent them in the future. 
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CHAPTER 3 “FIRE RISK AND FIRE STATION SITING IN DETROIT – THE IS-
SUE OF DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY” 
3.1 Introduction 
This research investigates the link between quality of public service provision and available 
budget with respect to two aspects of distributional equity, equality and need. Effective July 1st, 
2012, the implementation of a new, smaller budget made it imperative for the Detroit Fire Depart-
ment to decrease labor input on any given day. Fire stations had to be closed, leading to a less 
dense fire station grid in some areas of the city for the remainder of the year.  
To motivate this study, I review excerpts of relevant literature on criteria determining op-
timal fire station siting. The research question is then addressed empirically by analyzing fire in-
cident micro data for the year 2012, collected by Detroit’s fire department.  
First, I compare Detroit fire incident data from 2012, before and after the change in budget, 
in a simple OLS framework to find out whether fire response time as a quality indicator of public 
fire service has changed significantly as a consequence of the change in budget.  
In a second step, I introduce box plots and first-difference analysis in order to address the 
matter of equity interpreted as equality of public service distribution. Performing intra-city panel 
comparison on census tract level, I am able to investigate whether fire response time has changed 
uniformly across Detroit, or if tracts in the peripheries of former stations experience more dramatic 
changes in service quality than others.  
After I briefly review the connection between fire risk and various socio-economic factors, 
I assess the change in budget with regard to equity interpreted as need. Finally, I create an index 
to determine potential fire risk, before the theory is then tested with various forms of variance 
analyses using Detroit micro data.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
One of the most important decisions, if not the paramount decision, a fire department has 
to make is where to site its stations in a given area, such as a city. It is therefore no wonder that a 
great body of literature exists regarding this question, covering both theoretical models and ad-
dressing the application of these models to real world examples. One further complication to this 
already challenging task is that cities find themselves in a constant state of flux, which means that 
planners have to deal with cycles of development, decay, and redevelopment, continuously chang-
ing the demands on fire service. The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the important 
achievements made in this field, and to show how this study might still be able to fill a small, yet 
important, niche. 
As early as 1968, Hogg attended to the optimal siting of fire stations. She pointed out that 
the optimum is achieved when no alteration of the station locations can decrease the total spread 
of all fires, measured in monetary terms. Following standard economic theory, Hogg then further 
specified the optimum by comparing the marginal cost and marginal benefit of an additional fire 
station. Applying her theory to the city of Bristol, United Kingdom, she developed an algorithm 
determining where an additional fire station should be positioned, in order for its impact to be 
maximized. 
Toregas et al. (1971) used linear programming in a constrained optimization setup to figure 
out the minimum number of emergency service facilities, such as fire stations, to cover any given 
area. As a constraint in this so-called location set covering problem (LSCP), they used maximum 
response time within which a response unit must be able to arrive on scene. In 1972, Toregas and 
ReVelle enhanced previous findings by acknowledging that some sort of social utility measure-
ment should also alter the decision-making process of optimal fire station location. As the task of 
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need and desire determination is quite a difficult one for decision makers, the authors proposed a 
preference curve, where various values of maximum distance were linked to levels of necessary 
funding. 
In 1972, Guild and Rollin investigated the optimal number of fire stations with a focus on 
graphic, ready-to-use representation of scenarios, given a multitude of assumptions. In so doing, 
they took into account area size and workload per station, as well as other factors, such as the 
average cost of running a fire station versus the average cost of fire loss. 
Plane and Hendrick (1977) calculated the optimal siting of fire stations for Boulder, Colo-
rado. In collaboration with the city council, the researchers set out to develop a more efficient 
method of service provision. Their goal was to maintain the status quo in service quality while 
providing service at a lower cost. Similarly to previous works, a set-covering problem was defined 
and evaluated based on a number of constraints. These included the maximum permitted response 
time, as well as a set of areas imposing an increased fire hazard, and, thus, potentially requiring 
more attention by the fire service. As a result, the new proposed configuration allowed the closing 
of several fire stations, while response time was decreased or at least held constant. 
Kolesar and Blum (1973) developed an index to describe the relationship between the num-
ber of fire stations and the average distance traveled by a fire service company. According to their 
model, the expected distance (D) between the nearest fire station and points where fires could 
occur is determined by the quotient of a constant of proportionality (K) and the square root of the 
number of fire stations (N), for any given area (A). Therefore, D=K/(N/A)1/2, which can be used to 
assess resource allocation plans, given certain response time requirements. 
Over time, more sophisticated programming tools and models, accounting for previously 
omitted variables, evolved. ReVelle (1991) presented various improved optimization models. 
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Based on the maximum covering location problem (MCLP), developed by Church and ReVelle 
(1974), which additionally accounted for demand frequency and individual siting cost, additional 
coverage models were created. For instance, these models accounted for a situation where emer-
gency units are busy at the time an additional call is received. In addition, probabilistic models 
were developed and further improved.  
Badri et al. (1998) employed a multi-objective programming approach to assist the city of 
Dubai with the restructuring of their fire station grid. Taking into account eleven strategic goals, 
such as demand, distance, time, and water availability, the authors found that the original setup is 
only 60 percent efficient. They also documented the difficult task of accurately implementing fire 
engine travel times, as well as the challenge of finding an adequate solution depending on which 
of the sometimes conflicting goals the planner wants to maximize. 
In the more recent past, the use of geographical information systems (GIS) has become 
standard to determine optimal station siting. Liu and Huang (2006), for instance, used a combina-
tion of GIS spatial representation capabilities and ant colony optimization algorithms to improve 
transport routes for fire service vehicles in Singapore. Taking into account a multi-objective frame-
work, the authors succeeded in finding the optimal location for additional stations so as to reduce 
response time from eight to five minutes. 
Chevalier et al. (2012) developed a decision-aiding tool for planners to find the optimal 
location for fire stations in Belgium. Their contribution to the already existing body of literature 
is highlighted by the innovative risk modeling approach implemented on a national scale. Based 
on eleven years of national survey data, collected from all 251 fire stations, the authors constructed 
maps to visualize fire risk patterns across the country. Based on this information, the authors then 
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developed a heuristic to determine a fire station grid that minimizes cost, while meeting various 
other quality constraints.  
Finally, Murray (2013) addressed the optimal location problem in response to efforts by 
the Elk Grove, California, Fire Department to accommodate expected population growth with a 
number of additional stations. Here, the achievement of response time was imperative. Using GIS 
and variations of the MCLP, the author estimated the number of additional fire stations necessary, 
based on radii response time analysis. He also calculated various other scenarios, including larger 
areas of operation per fire station and corresponding effects on total costs.  
After this brief investigation into examples of previous studies, it seems that the vast ma-
jority of them are concerned with service efficiency, and only a few of them explicitly account for 
factors determining fire risk. Furthermore, it seems that up to this point no effort has been made to 
link the question of optimal fire station location to the issue of distributional equity. Therefore, 
this first attempt, proposed in this paper, can contribute to existing literature and will hopefully 
attract further research in the same direction. 
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3.3 Empirical Analysis 
3.3.1 Research question and data 
Map 9 shows the city of Detroit, divided into census tracts. The stars mark the locations of 
all fire stations. With the implementation of a new, smaller budget at the beginning of July, 2012, 
the number of firefighters on duty per day decreased by about 30 percent for the remainder of the 
year. To accommodate this change, 13 of the 42 fire stations previously in operation across Detroit 
were closed. These stations are represented in the map by red stars. The remaining 29 stations 
(green stars) stayed open for the remainder of the year. As the fire station grid becomes less dense, 
it seems obvious that overall travel distance from the remaining stations to the site of operation 
increases, which would lead to an increase in travel time and, thus, in total response time.  
The following section sets out to find evidence for a significant correlation, supporting this 
hypothesis. However, as the map shows, the station closing has taken place primarily in the central 
and downtown areas of the city, whereas the western, northern, and eastern outskirts seem to be 
largely unaffected by the changes. Correspondingly, the yellow shaded areas show census tracts 
where distance from census centroid to nearest fire station has increased after the implementation 
of the new budget. Based on these observations, the remaining sections of this chapter seek to 
analyze whether the closing of fire stations had an effect on various interpretations of distributional 
equity of fire service, in particular equity in terms of equality and equity in terms of need. 
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Map 9: Detroit fire stations 2012 
 
The data used for this analysis are provided by the Detroit fire department. The raw data 
set consists of every incident the fire service responded to in 2012. The data are collected electron-
ically, using a combination of CAD- (computer-aided dispatch) data and NFIRS- (National Fire 
Incident Reporting System) data. The time period from December 11th, 2012 to December 16th, 
2012 is not provided in the data set due to systemic malfunction. All incidents in the data set are 
consistently marked as “priority 1 incidents” and handled by the fire department. No exclusive 
runs by the emergency medical services (EMS) are included. Furthermore, I only take into account 
records indicated as “building fire”, in order to ensure a homogeneous data set. Following Upson 
& Notarianni (2012), I drop observations with a response time of 0.00min, as these may not be 
accurate due to system failure and human error. After data cleaning, the sample consists of N = 
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5,731 observations. The data are then matched to American Community Survey data (ACS), in 
order to acquire information regarding socio-economic specifications of an area where a fire-re-
lated incident took place. I use data collected over a 5-year period, 2008 – 2012, for all 297 census 
tracts of Detroit. 
3.3.2 Fire response time and budget 
This first part of the analysis aims to provide insight into the effect of a change in budget 
on the quality of public fire service. Total fire response time is used as the dependent variable. It 
is a common indicator of service quality for police, fire, and EMS. Defined as the aggregate of 
turnout time and travel time, this indicator is recorded routinely by public safety organizations 
(Flynn, 2009). Definitions are provided by the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) and its 
“1710” guide for “Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 
Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments” 
(NFPA, 2010). According to these guidelines, turnout time begins with the audible or visible no-
tification of the emergency response unit (ERU) and ends with the beginning of travel time, which 
ends with the arrival of the ERU on scene. The NFPA also provides performance objectives for 
professional fire services, according to which turnout time should not exceed 80 seconds, while 
travel time should not be greater than 240 seconds. These goals ought to be achieved in 90 percent 
of all cases.  
Independent variables are composed of a categorical variable, capturing the effect of the 
change in budget, as well as various other control variables. Although the budget was officially 
implemented on July 1st, 2012, the adjustments did not take place instantly. Records show that 
some of the 13 stations to be closed responded to emergency calls until August 5th, 2012. There-
fore, I define the categorical variable budget change as the time periods from January 1st, 2012 to 
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August 5th, 2012, and from August 6th, 2012 to December 31st, 2012. For reasons already explained 
above, I would expect a positive correlation between total response time and this categorical vari-
able. Secondly, I control for travel distance, as it seems only logical that this control variable is 
strongly positively determining travel time. The variable is constructed as the shortest distance a 
fire engine can possibly take from its station to the incident, given prevailing infrastructure and 
traffic regulations compliance. 
Following Upson and Notarianni (2012), I also include time of day, a categorical variable 
accounting for different periods of a 24-hour shift, when an emergency call is received by the 
ERU. The shift is divided into three sections, daytime: 6am to 6pm, evening: 6pm to midnight, 
and nighttime: midnight to 6am. The authors find a significant increase in response time for calls 
received during nighttime, which is why I would expect a similar result for this analysis. Next, I 
control for seasonal effects by coding another binary variable, which compares late spring to late 
summer months (mid-March to mid-October) with the remaining seasons of the year. A higher 
workload, typical for these months, may increase response time. Weather conditions is another 
dummy variable which indicates days in which fire response time might be extended due to severe 
weather conditions such as heavy rain, fog, or snow.  
Next, I account for housing density in a census tract, calculated as the number of housing 
units per acre. The idea is that greater housing density might lead to higher traffic volume and 
street congestion, which would increase response time. Similarly, I control for population density, 
constructed as the number of people residing in a census tract per acre, as Detroit displays a very 
different structure across various geographical areas. The core, midtown and downtown, along the 
Woodward Avenue corridor, is very different in density, infrastructure, and level of occupancy 
compared to the more suburban, or even “rural”, areas in the east and the west. Likewise, the fire 
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station grid is much denser in the midtown and downtown region, which would imply a negative 
correlation between this control variable and response time.  
Additionally, I account for the median housing unit value in a census tract. The logic behind 
this is that, following classic fire station location strategies, stations are located close to areas 
where the potential damage of a fire is relatively higher than in other areas, for instance, close to 
public buildings such as schools, or private buildings such as office buildings (Lucy, 1981). There-
fore, housing unit value might be negatively related to response time. Finally, I include the number 
of vacant units per 1000 housing units of a tract where a fire occurred. The correlation to fire 
response time is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher level of vacancy could indicate less activity 
in the area, which in turn could lead to a lower response time. On the other hand, literature shows 
that high vacancy might lead to an increased number of fires, either accidental or intentional, es-
pecially when vacant buildings are actually abandoned. Therefore, the volume of fires to be han-
dled by fire stations might increase, and with it response time (see, e.g., Shai, 2006).5 
I use a simple OLS framework to estimate the model. It takes the following classic form: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑿) + 𝜖, (45) 
where 𝑦 is the dependent variable, 𝜲 is a vector of all independent variables, and 𝜖 is the random 
error term. Various standard tests are carried out to ensure that the Gauss-Markov assumptions for 
unbiased model specification are met. A maximum variance inflation factor-test score of 1.68 in-
dicates that multi-collinearity does not pose a severe problem to the model. I perform a Breusch-
Pagan-test for homoskedasticity which finds significant evidence for the presence of heteroske-
                                                          
5 Table 4 of the appendix summarizes the variables determining the econometric model as well as their definitions. 
Additional summary statistics for key explanatory variables can be found in the appendix, Table 5. 
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dasticity (𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 58.22, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.00). The White-test also suggests that ho-
moskedasticity cannot be assumed for the model  (𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 93.62, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 = 0.0028) 
Therefore, the model is estimated using robust standard errors. 
Table 7 shows the results of this first regression. According to the 𝑅2-value, 13.9 percent 
of the variance in response time is explained by the model. Although this doesn’t seem particularly 
high, it is not unusual when dealing with noisy micro data. As expected, fire response time does 
significantly increase after the closing of the 13 fire stations, and the estimated coefficient of 
budget change is the highest among all explanatory variables. According to the calculations, the 
new budget is responsible for an increase in response time of almost 30 seconds compared to the 
situation before.  
Also not a surprise is the strong correlation between distance traveled and response time. 
The results suggest that response time increases by about 5 seconds for every tenth of a mile in-
crease in travel distance. Fire response time at times other than between midnight and six o’clock 
in the morning is considerably shorter than during the latter. An explanation might be that fire-
fighters on duty are asleep during the night, and need time to get up and put on their gear, before 
they can go on a run. The data also suggest a seasonal effect, according to which response time in 
the summer months is longer than in the winter months. This might be explained by the higher 
building fire rate in the summer months, leading to a higher workload for fire companies. Weather 
conditions turn out non-significant, which might partly be explained by the crudeness of this inde-
pendent variable, as it does not distinguish between light drizzle and heavy rain, nor does it take 
into consideration when the precipitation occurred during the day. Carmichael et al. (2004) propose 
a weather index which, among other things, accounts for temperature, precipitation, and sea level 
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pressure. Such a complex index requires very detailed data, which, unfortunately, were not obtain-
able while preparing this study. Meeting the expectations, housing density is statistically positively 
related to fire response time, while population density is significantly inversely related. The me-
dian value per housing unit and census tract shows no significant correlation, which means there 
is no evidence for the claim that the fire service response time is influenced by the value of a 
building. Finally, the higher the number of vacant units per tract the lower the fire response time, 
although the estimated coefficient turns out to be very small.  
Table 7: Fire response time determinates 
 (OLS) 
VARIABLES response time 
  
budget change 0.462*** 
 (0.0477) 
distance 0.768*** 
 (0.0363) 
t = 0600h-1800h -0.574*** 
 (0.0534) 
t = 1800h-0000h -0.676*** 
 (0.0551) 
season 0.164*** 
 (0.0455) 
weather 0.0652 
 (0.0450) 
housing density 0.0406** 
 (0.0181) 
population density -0.0331*** 
 (0.00627) 
housing value -0.000166 
(in thousands) (0.00109) 
vacancy -0.000968*** 
 (0.00024) 
Constant 4.183*** 
 (0.156) 
  
Observations 5,731 
R-squared 0.139 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.3.3 Budget and equality of service distribution  
The previous analysis reveals that there is strong evidence for the influence of the change 
in budget on fire response time. The question is now whether, aside from the overall observable 
increase, various areas of the city have been affected differently, and, thus, the level of distribu-
tional equity has changed compared to the situation before the new budget was implemented. To 
find out, I follow Lucy (1981) and Talen (1998), and their work regarding equity in the provision 
and distribution of local public services. Building on the works of Rawls (1971), Rescher (1966), 
and Musgrave (1959), Lucy (1981) discussed five dimensions of equity, equality, need, demand, 
preferences, and willingness to pay, which can support a local planner in deciding on a “fair” 
allocation of resources. Later on, Talen (1998) utilized these concepts, and developed “equity 
maps” to present single dimensions of distributional equity graphically.  
Applying their framework to the issue discussed here in this chapter, I use fire response 
time as a service quality indicator, in order to test for equality of service provision. Perfect equality 
would be reached if one uniform value of response time could be recorded for every building fire 
throughout the city. For obvious reasons, this goal seems to have mostly theoretical relevance, as 
it is downright impossible to achieve such a situation in the real world. Taking the variance in 
response time before the change in budget, for instance, we see that it is very obvious that service 
distribution is nowhere near perfect equality. However, relatively speaking, it is possible to analyze 
whether the change in budget caused a shift towards the fulfillment of this goal, or away from it.  
To find out, Table 8 presents some descriptive statistics of response time before and after 
the change in budget with regard to individual building fires in Detroit. After the change, the stand-
ard deviation of response time increased from 1.62 to 2.00, indicating a larger variation within the 
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data, and, thus, lower service equality. This observation makes intuitive sense, as the overall me-
dian distance from census tract centroid to closest operational fire station increased from 0.73 
miles to 0.91 miles as a result of the budget change. Greater travel distance per run leads to greater 
infrastructural heterogeneity and uncertainty en route and, thus, also to greater variation in re-
sponse time.  
The validity of this logic can be further tested by dividing the data into smaller subsets of 
treatment and control groups. As already pointed out at the beginning of this section, the yellow 
shaded census tracts, displayed in Map 9, are the ones which actually faced the increase in mini-
mum distance from their centroid to the closest operational fire station after the closing of the 13 
fire stations. Building fires within these tracts are regarded as the treatment group, whereas records 
of building fires in the remaining tracts form the control group. Looking at the treatment group 
first, Table 8 reports an increase in standard deviation from 1.56 before the change in budget to 
2.01 after it, while the median distance to the nearest fire station has almost doubled from 0.64 
miles to 1.2 miles. The standard deviation of the control group has changed from 1.63 to 1.94, 
while the median distance to the closest fire station was 0.80 miles for the entire year, 2012. In 
other words, standard deviation used to be greater in the control group before the change, while 
after the change it is greater in the treatment group. As it turns out, the difference in standard 
deviation between treatment and control groups on the individual level has increased from 4.6 
percent before, to 7.6 percent after, the station closing. This would suggest that service distribution 
is now less equal than before the budget change. Looking at median response time values of census 
tracts, however, we see that the results are different. Taking into account that, due to lack of ob-
servations, 38 census tracts have to be excluded from the analysis, now 𝑁 = 259, I find that despite 
the overall increase in variation, the difference in standard deviation between treatment and control 
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groups on census tract level has decreased from 19.4 percent to 11.5 percent. This result suggests 
a more equal service distribution after the change in budget, at least with regard to aggregated 
treatment and control group data. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics response time, in minutes 
      
response time N mean sd min max 
      
individual      
before change 3,649 4.376 1.617 0.120 18.62 
after change 2,170 4.957 2.003 0.120 17.73 
before change treatment group 845 4.452 1.562 0.150 14.22 
after change treatment group 550 5.452 2.101 0.170 17.32 
before change control group 2,804 4.353 1.633 0.120 18.62 
after change control group 1,620 4.789 1.941 0.120 17.73 
      
census tract      
before change 259 4.252 0.838 2.05 8.75 
after change 259 4.801 1.0699 1.99 9.09 
before change treatment group 64 4.353 0.728 2.99 6.37 
after change treatment group 64 5.152 0.968 3.48 7.98 
before change control group 195 4.217 0.8696 2.05 8.75 
after change control group 195 4.686 1.079 1.99 9.09 
      
 
Figure 2 shows simple box plots to graphically approach the question of distributional 
equality of fire service. Following a similar line of reasoning as in the previous discussion, I plot 
fire response time before and after the change, and also compare the treatment with the control 
group, using Detroit census tracts. For this analysis, I exclude outliers, since I’m predominantly 
interested in the overall trend in the data distribution. The graph for all building fires shows an 
increase in median response time from 4.20 to 4.60 minutes, which is accompanied by a positive 
skew in the distribution. It also shows that the inconsistency within the 25th and the 75th percentile 
has increased. Furthermore, it appears that the whiskers (representing the minimum and the max-
imum values) increased in length, indicating a wider overall spread in the data. Looking at the 
treatment group, we note that the effect of the budget change becomes even more apparent. The 
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50th percentile has increased from 4.30 to 5.08 minutes. The variation within the two middle quar-
tiles has increased as well, and ranges from 4.28 to 6.32 minutes after the change. The overall 
spread is now also greater than before. Finally, the median response time value for the control 
group has increased from 4.17 to 4.47 minutes, while the variation within the box after the change 
is very similar to the one within the treatment group at that point in time. The overall spread is 
again greater than it was before. Furthermore, the gap between treatment and control groups in 
terms of the 25th percentile has gone up from 0.22 to 0.68, and the gap for the 75th percentile has 
also widened from 0.07 to 0.7. Summarizing these observations, we can say that all three graphs 
suggest an increase in data variation due to the change in budget, and hence, one might argue that 
overall service equality has decreased. 
Figure 2: Box plot response time and budget change 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 T
im
e
before after
excludes outside values
All building fires
2
4
6
8
1
0
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 T
im
e
before after
excludes outside values
Treatment group
81 
 
 
 
 
Apart from descriptive and graphic analyses, it is also possible to use quantitative methods 
to explore the effect of the station closings on distributional equality. Two aspects are of interest. 
The first, more general question, is whether there exists a measurable effect in the change in me-
dian travel distance on the change in fire response time. The second, equality-specific question, is 
whether areas directly affected by the closing of stations in terms of the minimum distance to the 
closest station differ significantly from others. To find out, I use panel data analysis on the census 
tract level and employ a two period, first-difference strategy. The model takes the following gen-
eral form, following Greene (2008): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 +  𝒙𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑡 = 0, 1, (46) 
where 𝑦 is the dependent variable, 𝜃𝑡 is the constant term, 𝒙𝑖𝑡
′  is a vector of exogenous variables, 
𝑇𝑖 is the treatment dummy variable, 𝑢𝑖 is the group-specific random element, and 𝜖 is the zero 
mean disturbance. Applying this framework to the specific problem in question, we acquire the 
following, where subscript 𝑖 represents different census tracts: 
∆𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (𝜃1 − 𝜃0) + ∆𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑇𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡. (47) 
Employing the first-difference approach here seems justified, as, besides the advantage of remov-
ing any latent heterogeneity from the model, it is a common approach to quantify the effect of a 
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policy change, or the effect of a certain treatment, separating two periods of time. Therefore, the 
first-difference estimator seems capable of capturing the effect of the newly implemented budget; 
more specifically, it seems capable of estimating the effect of the station closing program on post-
closing response time. By separating census tracts into two groups, we find it is then possible to 
obtain additional information on the effect on distributional equality. 
For every census tract, I calculate the median response time, as well as the median distance 
traveled by fire companies to tackle building fires, before and after the implementation of the new 
budget. Following Map 9, we create a treatment variable in the form of a simple dummy to identify 
treatment and control groups. Again, the data set consists of 259 observations over two periods. 
According to the table, a strong overall variation in median response time (1.99 – 9.09 minutes) 
exists in the data. With a standard deviation of 0.998, response time follows a normal distribution; 
however, the data are distributed around an overall mean of 4.52 minutes. Furthermore, the “be-
tween standard deviation” is greater than the “within standard deviation”, indicating a greater var-
iation from one census tract to the other, compared to the variation for a single census tract from 
period one to period two. The overall standard deviation of travel distance is 0.56, with a mean of 
1.24 miles and a data spread between 0.25 and 3 miles. The between standard deviation is now 
about twice the level of the within standard deviation. Dividing the data into treatment and control 
groups again brings out a slightly more detailed picture. Now, the spread in the control group is 
greater. The treatment group response time values for between and within variation are similar to 
each other, while the within variation is greater than the between variation with regard to travel 
distance.6 
                                                          
6 Table 6 of the appendix provides summary statistics on the variables used in the regression. 
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Table 9 presents the results of the first-difference estimation. It shows that there is evidence 
for a positive significant correlation between the change in travel distance and the change in re-
sponse time, at least at a 90 percent confidence interval. A coefficient of 0.342 would suggest that 
a change of one mile in travel distance from one period to the next translates into a change of about 
20 seconds in response time. Moreover, the estimations show a strong significant difference be-
tween the treatment and control groups among census tracts. With a positive coefficient of 0.568 
at a 99 percent confidence interval, the first-difference estimator suggests a higher change in me-
dian response time of about 34 seconds per run for census tracts in the treatment group, compared 
with the control group. 
Table 9: Response time and distance change 
 (First-difference) 
VARIABLES ∆ response time 
  
∆ distance 0.342* 
 (0.1769) 
treatment 0.568*** 
 (0.1744) 
  
Observations 259 
R-squared 0.144 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overall, it appears that, depending on the viewpoint, the change in budget had ambiguous 
effects on distributional equality. On the one hand, there is evidence that overall variation in re-
sponse time has increased together with mean values, and that it had a different effect on the treat-
ment group than it had on the control group. On the other hand, it seems that comparing the two 
groups in terms of difference of within-group variation, the gap between them has narrowed from 
one period to the next. 
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3.3.4 Budget and need satisfaction 
Lucy (1981) and Talen (1998) describe a second manner of interpreting equity from a plan-
ner’s point of view, which is the concept of need satisfaction. In contrast to the previous interpre-
tation of equity as equality, this concept willingly accepts and even demands the unequal treatment 
of unequals. More precisely, instead of aiming for a most uniform treatment of individuals, equity 
interpreted as need satisfaction aims to allocate resources towards individuals who are relatively 
worse off than others in any given comparable aspect or dimension. Using this understanding in 
the context of fire protection, one might argue that special attention should be given to individuals 
facing a higher fire risk than others, or, more generally speaking, to areas, where the probability 
of building fires is higher than in others. This part of the paper analyzes the effect of the change in 
budget on equity interpreted as need. In so doing, I present means to link individual socio-eco-
nomic and other factors to quality of fire service. 
In its simplest form, an indicator determining fire risk in a certain area could be calculated 
ex post on the basis of standardized fire incident frequency, such as building fires per 1000 housing 
units in a given period of time. We can then go one step further, and ask what actually determines 
the incident frequency. An extensive body of literature addresses influential factors where, for 
instance, many of them find the level of poverty to be positively correlated with fire risk and some 
of them the level of unemployment (see, e.g., Gunther (1981), Fahy and Norton (1989), Chhetri et 
al. (2010)). Others note that housing age, the level of vacancy, and the rate of abandoned structures 
may also positively influence fire risk (see, e.g., Accordino (2000), Shai (2006)). Consistent with 
the concept of equity interpreted as need, one might therefore argue, for instance, that areas with 
a relatively higher poverty rate need better fire service than other areas where the poverty rate is 
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relatively lower. A similar argument could be made for housing age, vacancy, abandonment, or 
any other determining factor.  
Taking Detroit as an example, I suggest that a more tangible approach is the following. In 
a first step, it is possible to calculate the median value of census tract poverty levels among house-
holds across Detroit, where I again resort to 5-year ACS data. It is then easy to figure out which 
areas face a poverty level above, and which areas face a poverty level below, this value. In a second 
step, we can calculate the median of any desired quality of service indicator. Since we have already 
seen that fire response time is strongly positively correlated with travel distance, we can again use 
the distance from the census tract centroid to the nearest fire station as an indicator of service 
quality. Following the above logic, we would accept a negative deviation from the poverty median 
in combination with a positive deviation from the median in terms of distance to the nearest fire 
station, and vice versa. A perfectly fair situation would then be achieved where the deviations of 
both variables cancel each other out; in other words, where the sum of both values is equal to zero.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the percentage deviation from the median both for the level of poverty 
as well as for the minimum distance between centroid and the closest fire station for every tract 
before and after the station closing. The observations are ranked according to the deviation from 
poverty median, starting with the minimum. Note that five census tracts had to be excluded from 
the analysis, due to lack of data availability.7 In a perfectly fair fire service distribution, we would 
expect a symmetrical formation of individual observations around zero, so that the chart would 
appear somewhat like an hourglass. However, inspecting both charts, we observe that no such 
conclusion can be drawn, nor can a trend be spotted easily. Moreover, simply by visual inspection, 
                                                          
7 Census tracts 9850, 9852, 9853, 9855, and 9859 had to be excluded from the analysis. 
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it is not possible to determine whether the change in budget has caused a significant shift towards 
or away from the fulfillment of perfect equity. 
Figure 3: Poverty and minimum travel distance before 
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Figure 4: Poverty and minimum travel distance after 
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To get a better hold of the data, Figures 5 and 6 only show observations of the control 
group; in other words, observations where the minimum distance to the closest fire station hasn’t 
changed with the new budget. Although far from being perfect, it appears that, for many observa-
tions, poverty and distance deviation move in the opposite direction, indicating the unequal treat-
ment of unequals. Furthermore, it seems that the number of observations, which are deviating 
negatively from the distance median, has increased after the new budget was implemented. This 
observation seems plausible, as the overall median has also increased. 
Figure 5: Poverty and minimum travel distance control before 
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Figure 6: Poverty and minimum travel distance control after 
 
Finally, observations of the treatment group are presented in Figures 7 and 8. Before the 
change in budget, no symmetrical distribution is apparent; however, it seems that the majority of 
the observations display a negative deviation from the distance median. That would suggest that 
quality of service tends to be relatively high, even in areas where fire risk is lower than it is in 
other areas of the city. Whereas no symmetrical distribution can be recorded after the change in 
budget, either, the distribution of distance deviations is now almost the complete opposite of what 
we could observe before the change. It seems that now, with only few exceptions, the observations 
deviate positively from the median. In other words, quality of service is now relatively lower, even 
in areas that face a higher fire risk than others. 
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Figure 7: Poverty and minimum travel distance treatment before 
 
 
Figure 8: Poverty and minimum travel distance treatment after 
 
Especially with regard to the treatment group, the observations suggest that the change in budget 
caused a shift away from the goal of perfect equity interpreted as need.  
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Based on this preliminary assessment, I employ statistical analyses to test its validity, and 
to find additional evidence for or against need satisfaction as a result of the change in budget. A 
technique appropriate for this type of investigation is the analysis of variance (ANOVA). Perform-
ing a simple one-way variance test, I’m able to compare the difference in means of a certain nor-
mally distributed dependent variable with respect to various groups of an independent, categorical 
variable. The null hypothesis is that groups do not significantly differ in their group means. In step 
one, I look at poverty both for the control and the treatment groups. Table 10 presents the results. 
With a ratio of 222 to 70, the control group is more than three times as large as the treatment group. 
As this inequality may lead to distortions in the estimated results, I also take a random sample of 
50 observations for both groups. The results for this sample analysis are reported in parentheses; 
the full description can be found in the appendix (Table 7). Normal distribution is verified through 
histograms. The mean poverty level of the treatment group is 0.432 (0.430), whereas the same 
value for the control group is 0.382 (0.387). With an F-statistic of 7.82 (2.84) and a significance 
level of 𝑝 < 0.01 (𝑝 < 0.1), we can reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the mean poverty 
level significantly differs between groups. Based on these findings, I perform a similar analysis 
with regard to the minimum distances to the closest fire stations for both groups before and after 
the cut in budget. Before the change, the control group has a mean distance value of 0.863 (0.920), 
and the treatment group exhibits a value of 0.643 (0.634). The between group difference (F-statistic 
= 15.19 (13.36)) is significant at a 99 percent confidence level. However, looking at the results for 
the comparison after the station closing, we find that the mean of the control group is unchanged 
(distance from fire station unchanged), while the mean of the treatment group has increased to 
1.233 (1.20) miles, which is double the distance. The F-statistic has increased drastically to 42.46 
(12.53) and is strongly significant. Based on this test, I conclude that, compared to the control 
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group, both mean values of poverty and distances are significantly higher in the treatment group 
after the budget change. This indicates a shift away from perfect distributional equity interpreted 
as need satisfaction. The change had the effect of worsening distributional equity. 
Table 10: ANOVA results 
        
 N Mean sd SS df MS F-stat 
        
poverty        
treatment 70 0.432 0.112     
control 222 0.382 0.137     
between group    0.134 1 0.134 (7.82)*** 
within group     4.984 290 0.017  
total 292 0.394 0.133 5.119 291 0.018  
        
distance before        
treatment 70 0.643 0.304     
control 222 0.863 0.439     
between group    2.567 1 2.567 (15.19)*** 
within group     49.005 290 0.169  
total 292 0.810 0.421 51.572 291 0.177  
        
distance after        
treatment 70 1.233 0.324     
control 222 0.863 0.439     
between group    7.298 1 7.298 (42.46)*** 
within group     49.848 290 0.172  
total 292 0.952 0.443 57.146 291 0.196  
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
After this one-dimensional approach towards fire risk, we can now propose an index to 
accommodate various dimensions of fire risk. As mentioned previously, this might enable us to 
construct a more accurate probability of fire risk, based on socio-economic, housing, and other 
influential factors. Following Watts and Kaplan (2001), who develop an index to evaluate fire risk 
of historic buildings, the index could take the following general multi-dimensional linear form: 
𝛱𝑖
𝐹 = ∑𝑤𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
, (48) 
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where Π𝐹  indicates fire risk, 𝐷 represents dimensions determining fire risk, and 𝑤 denotes weights 
attributed to the various dimensions of 𝐷 with respect to geographical area 𝑖. Following the above 
line of reasoning, equation 3 can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛱𝑖
𝐹 = ∑(𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑖 + 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑖),
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (49) 
where [𝑆, 𝐻] symbolize socio-economic and housing factors, respectively. For the purposes of this 
study, I chose two indicators for each dimension, and, for simplicity, set 𝑤𝑖 = 1. The weights 
could, for instance, be based on level of significance, or coefficient value. After the adjustment, 
equation 4 takes the following simplified form: 
Π𝑖
𝐹 = ∑(𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖),
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (50) 
where unemployment is measured as the share of unemployed among the labor force, housing age 
is defined as the share of old housing stock, built before 1939, and vacancy is the share of vacant 
structures per tract. The data are based on ACS 5-year census tract estimates for 2012. All variables 
are recorded in percentage form. After the index is calculated, it is standardized, so that Π𝑖
𝐹 =
[0,1].  
Table 11 shows the results of the one-way ANOVA estimation. Note that one census tract 
(9851) had to be dropped from the analysis due to lack of observations. Therefore, the control 
group consists of 222 observations, while the treatment group consists of 69 observations. As be-
fore, I generate a random sample of 50 observations for each group, reported in parentheses. The 
full description can be found in the appendix (Table 8). In both cases, the Bartlett’s test result is 
insignificant, suggesting that unequal variance between groups is not an issue. The mean value of 
the fire risk index for the control group is 0.529 (0.535), while the mean for the treatment group is 
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0.640 (0.645). With a value of 26.74 (12.85), the F-statistic suggests a significant difference be-
tween group means at a 99 percent confidence interval. This result confirms previously obtained, 
one-dimensional estimates.  
Table 11: ANOVA results fire risk index 
        
 N mean sd SS df MS F-stat 
        
risk index        
treatment 69 0.640 0.143     
control 222 0.529 0.160     
between group    0.651 1 0.651 (26.74)*** 
within group     7.030 289 0.024  
total 291 0.556 0.163 7.680 290 0.027  
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In summary, it appears that the goal of perfect equity interpreted as need satisfaction is not 
achieved either before or after the fire station closing in Detroit. However, the data suggest the 
change in budget shifted fire safety further away from perfect need satisfaction.  
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3.4 Discussion 
The analysis presented in this paper on the topic of distributional equity carries various 
interesting implications, some of which I would like to address briefly in this section. First of all, 
it is clear that the accomplishment of this study can only be described as small, considering the 
vast and complex topic of distributional equity in the context of public service provision. Many 
experts in the field will have very good arguments to demonstrate why economists should primar-
ily be concerned with aspects of maximizing efficiency, rather than equity. However, equity is a 
fundamental aspect of welfare economics that has been ignored by many, simply because of a lack 
of good answers to admittedly difficult questions. As the literature review has shown, most public 
planners have moved towards a multi-dimensional, constrained optimization approach when it 
comes to determining the optimal location of fire stations. Equity offers a very rich additional 
dimension, which should find significant consideration in the siting process. As the preceding 
analysis with respect to Detroit has shown, accounting for quality may lead to a very different 
outcome of station siting. I have shown that simple fire risk indexes can be created, extensively 
refined, and linked to quality of service indicators. More research in this direction is desirable and 
necessary. 
One major shortcoming of this study is that budget constraints, and especially the question 
of who should pay for fire service, have been generously ignored. Planning based on need might 
explain, in contrast to common practice, why low income regions, or areas with a high fire risk 
score, should receive more attention by fire service than others, including a denser fire station grid 
and shorter response times. While public fire service is financed largely through tax money, one 
can rightly ask how people facing increased fire risk, who are therefore also likely to be poorer 
than others, are supposed to pay more for the service they need. Without any doubt, these concerns 
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are justified and impose a huge challenge on policy makers, social planners, and society in general, 
as priorities may have to be rearranged. 
Another important extension to this study involves the issue of flexibility in station (re-) 
location. Since cities, and therefore also fire risk factors attached to them, are changing constantly, 
so may fire service have to adjust constantly to accommodate these changes. A new form of station 
flexibility at a reasonable cost has to be developed and evaluated in the wider scheme of economic 
well-being.  
Finally, this study also fails to come up with an optimal fire station siting plan. However, 
based on the ideas proposed in this preliminary work, future in-depth investigation is necessary to 
develop an optimal plan, which is far beyond the scope of this research. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The goal of this study is to analyze public fire service in Detroit for the year 2012 with 
regard to two aspects of distributional equity, equality and need. This study especially sets out to 
find any differences in these dimensions based on the change in budget in the middle of 2012.  
Literature shows that most models are concerned with the efficient provision of public fire 
service, and that the question of equitable provision of public fire service plays only a minor role. 
A multiple linear regression with cross-sectional data from the year 2012 is performed to 
find out which factors determine fire response time as an indicator of service quality. I find evi-
dence for various factors significantly influencing fire response time, chief among which is travel 
distance, which is highly positively correlated with response time. I find that response time has 
significantly changed as a result of the change in budget. Thereafter, I demonstrate how minimum 
distance to the closest fire station has changed in some areas of Detroit due to the change in budget, 
while other areas have not been affected directly.  
I find ambiguous evidence for the effect of the change in budget on distributional equity 
interpreted as equality. While there is no doubt that overall service quality in terms of response 
time or travel distance has deteriorated, it is not fully clear whether service allocation is now more 
unequal than before.  
Thereafter, I perform various tests and propose a fire risk index to analyze the change in 
budget with respect to need satisfaction. I find strong evidence that, after the change, the allocation 
is less fair than before. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A 1: Equity and need of fire service, summary statistics 
poverty   before response time after 
group percentage count   count group minutes count 
1 0 ≥ x ≤ 0.307 27   60 1 0 ≥ x ≤ 3.8 32 
2 0.307 > x ≤ 0.383 44   49 2 3.8 > x ≤ 4.3 35 
3 0.383 > x ≤ 0.486 57   39 3 4.3 > x ≤ 4.8 40 
4 x > 0.486 48   30 4 x > 4.8 71 
total   176   176     176 
mean 0.42     4.18     4.6 
min 0.178     2.54     2.43 
max 0.679     6.37     7.21 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Figure A 1: Distribution of all building fires per 1000 housing units and census tracts 
 
 
Figure A 2: Distribution of unintentional building fires per 1000 housing units and census tracts 
 
 
Figure A 3: Distribution of intentional building fires per 1000 housing units and census tracts 
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Table A 2: Defined variables 
 Definition 
Dependent Variable  
all building fires (F1) 
A continuous variable indicating the number of building fires per 1000 
housing units (in log form). (CAD, NFIRS) 
unintentional building 
fires (F2) 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of unintentional fires per 
1000 housing units (in log form). (CAD, NFIRS) 
intentional building 
fires (F3) 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of intentional fires per 
1000 housing units (in log form). (CAD, NFIRS) 
Independent Variables  
Socio-economic  
poverty 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of households living be-
low the poverty level. (ACS) 
median income 
A continuous variable indicating the median household income (in thou-
sands). (ACS) 
unemployment rate 
A continuous variable indicating the number of unemployed people. 16 
years and over, as a percentage of the civilian labor force. (ACS) 
unemployment rate 
16 - 19 
A continuous variable indicating the level of unemployment among 16 and 
19 year old. (ACS) 
unemployment rate 
20 - 24 
A continuous variable indicating the level of unemployment among 20 and 
24 year olds. (ACS) 
child 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of households having one 
child or more. (ACS) 
single parents 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of households where a 
child 18 years old or younger is raised by a single parent. (ACS) 
single male 15-17 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of single males between 
15 and 17 years old among all males 15 years and older. (ACS) 
single male 18-24 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of single males between 
18 and 24 years old among all males 15 years and older. (ACS) 
age 65 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of households with one 
householder >=65years old living alone. (ACS) 
Housing  
housing unit value 
A continuous variable indicating the dollar value per housing unit (in ten 
thousands). (ACS) 
housing unit age 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of building stock built 
prior to 1939. (ACS) 
vacancy rate 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of vacant structures. 
(ACS) 
abandoned structures 
A continuous variable indicating the percentage of abandoned structures 
as a fraction of vacant structures. (ACS) 
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Table A 3: Summary statistics 
      
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
building fires 283 4.186 0.674 1.928 6.103 
unintentional fires 283 2.043 0.512 0.318 3.241 
intentional fires 275 1.973 0.894 -0.780 4.044 
poverty 283 0.394 0.132 0.0620 0.790 
median income 283 27.61 11.35 10.36 82.43 
unemployment 283 0.289 0.104 0.0530 0.675 
unemployment 16-19 283 0.604 0.335 0 1 
unemployment 20-24 283 0.397 0.264 0 1 
child 283 0.283 0.0991 0.0180 0.581 
single parents 283 0.700 0.203 0 1 
single male 15-17 283 0.0338 0.0241 0 0.224 
single male 18-24 283 0.0443 0.0280 0 0.152 
age 65 283 0.104 0.0574 0 0.299 
housing value 283 6.112 3.149 1.980 27.86 
housing age 283 0.354 0.219 0 0.864 
vacancy 283 0.299 0.113 0.0484 0.597 
abandonment 283 0.593 0.236 0 1 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A 4: Defined variables 
 Definition 
Dependent Variable  
total fire response time 
A continuous variable, indicating the time it takes the fire service to arrive on 
scene, after an emergency call is received. (CAD, NFIRS) 
Independent Variables  
budget change 
A categorical variable, 0 for the time before the budget was implemented, 
01/01/2012 – 08/05/2015 and 1 for the time after the budget was imple-
mented, 08/06/2012 – 12/31/2012. (CAD, NFIRS) 
distance 
A continuous variable, indicating distance traveled from station to location of 
incident, in miles. (CAD, NFIRS) 
time of the day 
A categorical variable, 1 if t = 0600h-1800h, 2 if t = 1800h-0000h, 3 if t = 
0000h-0600h. (CAD, NFIRS) 
season 
A categorical variable, 0 for 01/01/2015 - 03/14/2015 and 10/16/2015 – 
12/31/2015, 1 for 03/15/2012 – 10/15/2012, 1 for 10/16. (CAD, NFIRS) 
weather 
A categorical variable, 0 if no rain, fog or snow was recorded that day, 1 other-
wise. 
housing density  
A continuous variable, constructed as the number of housing units per acre in 
one census tract. (ACS)  
population density 
A continuous variable, constructed as the number of people per acre in one 
census tract. (ACS) 
housing unit value 
A continuous variable, indicating the dollar value per housing unit, in ten thou-
sands. (ACS) 
vacancy  
A continuous variable, indicating the number of vacant units per 1000 housing 
units in one census tract. (ACS) 
 
Table A 5: Summary statistics regression 1 
      
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
response time 5,819 4.593 1.793 0.120 18.62 
distance 5,818 1.226 0.626 0.100 3.500 
housing density 5,731 4.364 1.541 1.326 10.46 
population density 5,731 9.245 4.360 0.729 24.33 
housing value (in thousands) 5,731 53.51 22.43 19.80 278.6 
vacancy (per thousand housing units) 5,731 316.0 103.1 48.40 597.4 
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Table A 6: Summary Statistics panel 
        
VARIABLES  mean sd min max  Obs 
        
response time overall 4.526 0.998 1.99 9.09 N = 518 
 between  0.836 2.385 7.825 n = 259 
 within  0.548 2.121 6.931 T = 2 
distance overall 1.237 0.560 0.25 3 N = 518 
 between  0.504 0.325 3 n = 259 
 within  0.245 0.337 2.137 T = 2 
treatment        
response time overall 4.752 0.942 2.99 7.98 N = 128 
 between  0.6998 3.235 6.805 n = 64 
 within  0.634 2.792 6.712 T = 2 
distance overall 1.395 0.571 0.25 2.7 N = 128 
 between  0.381 0.775 2.35 n = 64 
 within  0.427 0.495 2.295 T = 2 
control        
response time overall 4.452 1.006 1.99 9.09 N = 390 
 between  0.864 2.385 7.825 n = 195 
 within  0.517 2.047 6.857 T = 2 
distance overall 1.185 0.548 0.25 3 N = 390 
 between  0.529 0.325 3 n = 195 
 within  0.143 0.385 1.985 T = 2 
        
 
Table A 7: ANOVA results sample 
        
 N mean sd SS df MS F-stat 
        
poverty        
treatment 50 0.430 0.116     
control 50 0.387 0.139     
between group    0.04734 1 0.047 (2.84)* 
within group     1.606 98 0.016  
total 100 0.409 0.130 1.652 99 0.017  
        
distance before        
treatment 50 0.634 0.294     
control 50 0.920 0.470     
between group    2.053 1 2.053 (13.36)*** 
within group     15.060 98 0.154  
total 100 0.777 0.416 17.113 99 0.173  
        
distance after        
treatment 50 1.200 0.302     
control 50 0.920 0.470     
between group    1.957 1 1.957 (12.53)*** 
within group     15.304 98 0.156  
total 100 1.060 0.418 17.261 99 0.174  
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Table A 8: ANOVA results fire index sample 
        
 N mean sd SS df MS F-stat 
        
risk index        
treatment 50 0.645 0.149     
control 50 0.535 0.159     
between group    0.304 1 0.304 (12.85)*** 
within group     2.320 98 0.024  
total 100 0.590 0.163 2.624 99 0.027  
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ABSTRACT 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
Chapter 1 is concerned with the effect of public fire service quality on individual utility. I 
develop a theoretical model to account for fire risk as a function of socio-economic, housing, and 
spatial factors. I review relevant literature on certain inherent public fire service issues regarding 
technology and cost structure before I briefly discuss the importance of public fire service with 
regard to overall social welfare. Finally, I employ equity mapping in a case study to assess the 
effect of a budget cut on equity of fire service allocation in Detroit. 
Chapter 2 examines whether socio-economic factors, various aspects of housing, and spa-
tial features can explain differences in building fire risk across Detroit. Using a complete Detroit 
fire incidents data set for the years 2008-2012, matched by census tract to American Community 
Survey (ACS) data for the same period, I employ kernel density mapping and spatial regression 
techniques to address the research question. Estimations suggest a positive correlation between 
poverty and fire risk, especially with regard to intentional building fires. In the case of uninten-
tional building fires, no such conclusion can be drawn easily. I find evidence for fire clustering and 
spillover effects. 
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Chapter 3 approaches the question of optimal fire station siting in Detroit from a welfare 
economics viewpoint. Therefore, I assess the effects of a decrease in public budget in 2012 on 
distributional equity. First, regression analysis is used to determine the effect on response time 
as an indicator of fire service quality. Second, I use various statistical measures to evaluate intra-
city service distribution with respect to equality. Third, I develop a fire risk index and link it to 
service quality to determine need satisfaction. I find ambiguous effects on distributional equality, 
while there is strong evidence of the change in budget having a negative effect on equity inter-
preted as need. 
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